Decisions for War, 1914–1917

I thoroughly enjoyed reading Decisions for War, 1914-1917, by Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig. Hamilton and Herwig’s thesis is that the decisions made by the “nations” for war was made by small coteries of “elites” within each nation. They compare their thesis with the traditional theories of uncontrolled nationalism, imperialism, social Darwinism, and my favorite, entangling alliances.I appreciated the way the book began with a chapter on The Great War: A Review of the Explanations. The information provided was excellent. The authors mention that the French Revolution was a result of France’s financial difficulties brought on in part by French support to the United States during the American Revolution, this is a fact most Americans are unaware of. The author’s explanation of the battle death rates and intensity rates of the First and Second World Wars and other wars brought into perspective just how devastating the First and Second World Wars were. Their theory that there were actually seven world wars is also interesting as well as enlightening. I thought Hamilton and Herwig did an outstanding job organizing the book in a way that the reader could absorb the written information concerning one nation before moving on to the next. Often a reader becomes confused by who said or did what, and when, while reading about the causes of both World Wars. Organizing the book by devoting a chapter to each nation so the reader can learn, instead of just reading, was brilliant. The order of the nations discussed in the chapters was also logical; by starting with Austria-Hungary whose small coterie caused the first declaration of war, followed by Russia, whose small coterie initiated the mobilization which caused the small coterie in Germany to declare mobilization, which led to the French small coterie to order mobilization and so on, was effective and made understanding the sequence of events very easy.Hamilton and Herwig did a fine job of explaining the different concerns each nation’s small coterie had in making their decisions for war. For the coterie in Austria-Hungary it was fear of Serbia’s increasing influence in the Balkans and concern they might provide ideas of independence to minorities in the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. For the German coterie is was fear of encirclement by France and Russia, for Russia was the potential loss of prestige if a brother Slavic nation was destroyed by Austria-Hungary, and the resulting loss of respect among other Slavic entities. They way the authors laid these concerns out gives the reader an insight not only into the decisions for war that were made but also the material propagandists used to raise public support for the war after the decisions had been made.While Hamilton and Herwig were very convincing in their arguments and did not invalidate the theory of entangling alliances I still feel that these alliances were a major cause of the war. For instance, if Russia was not allied to France, perhaps France would not have mobilized in response to German Mobilization. Also, if Germany were not allied to Austria-Hungary perhaps Germany would not have mobilized in response to Russian mobilization. Germany would not have initiated the Schlieffen plan, Belgium would not have been invaded, and Great Britain might not have entered the war.I also think history has been too hard on the Kaiser. I do not think Wilhelm II wanted war. I believe that when the “Blank Check” to be given to Austria-Hungary he believed that any war would remain localized. In his memoirs he laments the fact that the German Foreign Office was not able to address the Entente’s encirclement policy in a peaceful manner because the German diplomats were not as good as the British, French or Russian diplomats. Wilhelm II also wrote that if he was expecting war to break out he would not have been on a yachting trip to Norway when Austria-Hungary delivered its ultimatum to Serbia, and when Serbia issued its response. Nor would he have been on an archeology trip to Corfu when the Russians mobilized. He also stated that while his advisors recognized the risk of war only von Moltke believed war would actually break out. The two authors made it more than plain that the Kaiser was the only person in Germany who could declare war, however I think Wilhelm II entered the war as a result of the intellectual bullying of his coterie, and with a heavy heart.In the book’s last chapter Hamilton and Herwig expertly explained their three conclusions that the War was a result of decisions made by the leaders of the five major belligerents, that those decisions were made by a small coterie, and that a proper study of the war’s origins must include the considerations that affected those small coteries. The authors support their thesis well, and are convincing. To the authors credit they did not do what many authors do with competing theories, i.e. give them short thrift. Hamilton and Herwig thoroughly explained the competing theories, compared them with their theories and evidence and in a display of supreme objectivity let the reader make up his/her own mind. The objectivity demonstrated by the authors made reading this book a pleasure.Decisions for War, 1914-1917,will become an important work in my library. I have a confident feeling that whenever I read a book or an article on the origins of World War One I will be returning to Hamilton and Herwig for validation. I would recommend this book to any student of the First World War.

Great product

The origins of the Great War have long been debated, with an abundant historiography discussing the causes of the great catastrophe. Among this vast literature at least 17 books have the title Origins of the First World War. The major themes include the alliance system, nationalism, social Darwinism, economic imperialism, militarism and the arms race, press agitation, the accidental war - that the initial combatants unintentionally slid into such a catastrophic war, and the domestic cause theme - that conservative elites, faced with serious internal threats, chose war to save their positions.In this thoroughly interesting and revealing study, the authors take a different tack, and get down to the nuts and bolts of how the respective nations actually became embroiled in the war. Eschewing the traditional themes, Hamilton and Herwig argue that a small coterie of no more than eight or ten men made the decision to go to war, and in some cases such as France, one dominant figure played the key role. In doing so, each group was motivated by separate and distinct sets of concerns. The authors make their case well, and remind us that over the course of history, the Great War was actually World War VIIFollowing a review of the above themes, and setting the scene of the international tensions prior to the war with an overview of the European Wars between 1815 and 1914 that undid the Congress of Vienna’s ‘balance of power’, the authors deal chronologically with each of the principal countries that entered the war between 1914 and 1917. Each gets a separate chapter, except Japan and the Ottoman Empire which share one, as do Bulgaria, Romania and Greece. In each study the constitutional framework pertaining to war powers for the country and a resume of the key players is outlined, while the international concerns confronting them, and in the case of the five powers that decided on war in July- August 1914, their reactions during the July Crisis are detailed. This is the real value of the book. The reader gains a clear insight into the thinking and concerns of those in each small coterie, backed by extensive quotes from diaries and documents, and the process by which they considered the emerging crisis. Dominant players emerge, who drove the discussions and decisions to engage in war. This makes informative reading, addressing the reasoning, or lack of, that resulted in the declarations of war, rather than the more esoteric “isms” often served up as causes. Perhaps the most sobering revelation is that rather than accidentally sliding into the catastrophe, several of Europe’s leaders knowingly embarked on a what would be an all consuming struggle - and one wonders at the logic or mindset that would not only contemplate, but actually decide to initiate such a disaster.One is left with the distinct impression that the overriding factor that drove the first four belligerents to declare war was one of fear - primarily a fear of a loss of prestige within Europe, and that their State was seriously threatened, hence Austria-Hungary’s determination to wage war on Serbia, and Germany’s “now or never” attitude with regard to Russia and France. The tensions of the moment ooze from the pages, with some players bordering on panic in the rush to be first. Other nations were driven by different motives. Although not directly threatened British concerns about Germany’s potential hegemony over Europe, and posing a direct challenge to the Empire, swayed them to reluctantly enter the fray. Others had more selfish reasons - territorial gain, and for some the decision on who to support was determined by which of the warring sides offered the best deal, while Germany’s strategic blunders dragged a reluctant United States into the conflict.In the concluding chapter, the authors summarise their views on the reasons each nation decided on war, and suggest the received themes on the origins of the war mentioned in the opening paragraph of this review are inadequate, or invalid. While they make their case convincingly, this reviewer feels the alliance system strongly influenced Russia’s and France’s decisions, while in the Dual Monarchy and Germany the military leadership played a dominant role. An instructive consideration of the various social and commercial elites concludes this fine book, and puts paid to the view that industrial and financial elites had any influence.Hamilton and Herwig have not only made a valuable contribution to our understanding of how the political elites of Europe recklessly plunged their nations into war, but have also provided an insight into their flawed and, in many cases, arrogant thinking. All is clearly told in an easily readable and digestible style, which delivers some surprises - to this reviewer at least. Decisions for War 1914-1917 provides a particularly useful balance to other views on the origins of the Great War.

Endlich einmal eine fair Darstellung, die einen komparativen Ansatz wählt und sich nicht von 100jähriger Propaganda leiten lässt. Setzt allerdings schon einige Kenntnisse der historischen Zusammenhänge von 1890 bis zum Beginn des 1. Weltkrieges voraus.