Malik and Medina: Islamic Legal Reasoning in the Formative Period (Islamic History and Civilization) (Islamic History and Civilization: Studies and Texts, 101)

This is an excellent analytic study of the applied reasoning of Mālik ibn Anas (d.179/795) as principally found in his Muwaṭṭaʾ and in the Mudawwana of Saḥnūn 'Abd al-Salām ibn Saʿīd (d. 240/854). It is primarily concerned with Medinese praxis (`amal) though it is also a comparative study of early Islamic reasoning; bringing to light the legal reasoning of Mālik's Kufan contemporary al-Nuʿmān ibn Thābit Abū Ḥanīfa (d.150/767) as well as that of Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shāfiʿī (d.204/820) and Ahmad ibn Hanbāl (d.241/855), who both belonged to the generation after Mālik.The main body of the work is divided in to two parts, "Mālik and the Medinese Tradition" and "Mālik's Terminology in the Muwaṭṭaʾ and the Mudawwana". The first part explores the personality of Mālik, his teachers, his works and his legal reasoning. This includes his use of the Qu'rān, the different types of ḥadīth, the Sunna, his view on consensus, legal regional customs and his use of inference, discretion, preclusion and the unstated good as well his utilisation of considered opinion and analogical reasoning. The first section ends with a very detailed exposition of the critiques of Medinese praxis as well as the perspective of the advocates of Medinese praxis. The second part of the work investigates the terms Mālik uses and what he himself said about his terminology. For example it begins with the sunna-terms i.e. when Mālik says "the sunna among us about which there is no dissent", "the sunna that has been long established", "the sunna among the Muslims" etc. There are numerous examples covering each specific term and how and when Mālik refers to them and utilises them as part of his reasoning in establishing inherited precedents. The same approach is then taken with terms referring to the People of Knowledge in Madina, affirmative praxis terms, negative praxis terms, amr-terms and so on, again replete with numerous examples to demonstrate his position and further your understanding of his usage of these terms.The work is well referenced and the footnotes are excellent and expand on important points that add to the detailed discussion demonstrating what Mālik conceived Medinese practice to be, how he determined its authenticity, and the methods by which he applied it in positive law. Dr. Wymann-Landgraf challenges the universally assumed acceptance that Medinese consensus (ijmā' ahl al-Madīna) and local practice are coextensive. He also points out that considered opinion (ra'y) was a praiseworthy attribute and not a derogatory term as it may be viewed today. In actual fact, one of Mālik's foremost teachers, Rabī'at al-Ra'y ibn Abī `Abd al-Raḥmān Farrūkh (d.136/753) took his epithet from the sophisticated use of the technique. He even points out that the categorisation of Kufan jurists into the "proponents of considered opinion" (ahl al-ra'y) and the Medinese into the "proponents of tradition" (ahl al-ḥadīth) is historically inaccurate and misleading. In reality Abū Ḥanīfa was, surprisingly, more textually deferential and ḥadīth-orientated than Mālik and this view is established throughout the book where applicable. It makes for an insightful read of the formative period and the tools employed by the great legal minds that codified the approach to the sources that constitute Islamic law as passed down to us today.There are many fascinating facets of the life of Mālik which this work brings to light. He was aware of the dissenting opinions and took active interest in them and would sometimes modify his personal legal opinions in light of the dissenting positions of other jurists, including those from Kufa. As many know, he is well known for his response "I don't know" and this cautious approach is demonstrated in his careful choosing of those from whom he took his knowledge. It is reported by `Abd Allah ibn Wahb ibn Muslim (d. 197/812) that Mālik commented that he has met in Medina those whose prayers would be answered and they received much knowledge and many ḥadīth but because they were taken in by excessive fear of God and asceticism they were not authoritative sources of knowledge. This is because he said this business of juristic pronouncement requires mindfulness of God, caution and understanding as to perceive what is coming out of your head and these very peopled lacked this perfection. When Mālik died seven chests of the ḥadīths collected by Muḥammad ibn Muslim ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī (d. 124/742) were found in his house. This further supports the belief that Mālik refrained from transmitting all the ḥadīth he knew just as he said he refrained from sharing what he learnt under Ibn Hurmuz. Of all the imams, none had more students from as widely diverse regional backgrounds as Mālik and this helped spread the School.In terms of Mālik's methodology and that generally of the Mālikī School with regard to fiqh, this work is very informative. Mālik's approach to the law was rational and pragmatic and applied in a manner consistent with the Medinese tradition as demonstrated in this work. For both Mālik and Abū Ḥanīfa, who both accepted connected and disconnected ḥadīths as well as post-Prophetic reports as valid sources for ascertaining the legal content of the sunna, knowledge of the sunna was the criterion against which ḥadīths were judged, interpreted, accepted or rejected and not the reverse. In the Mālikī School it connotes the Prophet's (ṣallā Allāhu ʿalayhi wasallam) normative example opposed to his exceptional precedents. It is interesting to see how this authenticity was gauged by Mālik in comparison to other jurists hence his comments with reference to solitary ḥadīths, "I do not know what the reality of this ḥadīth is", "We do not know what the proper explanation of it is" and more specifically in terms of his methodology, "This ḥadīth has come down to us, but the praxis is not in accordance with it." You will then find examples given by Dr. Wymann-Landgraf of this process. For instance, the solitary ḥadīth referring to the validity of a marriage with the presence of a guardian has been rejected as obligatory by Abū Ḥanīfa, though the ḥadīth is sound. Mālik however upheld it as a prerequisite, though he didn't accept the ḥadīth alone but accepted it because it agreed with Medinese praxis which is how Mālik assessed the legal implications of solitary ḥadīth. Another example would be Mālik's rejection of the prostration of gratitude which was attributed to Abū Bakr as-Șiddīq (d. 12/634), who after being made victorious in a battle is reported to have prostrated to God in gratitude. He rejected it as fabricated because many victories came to the Prophet (ṣallā Allāhu ʿalayhi wasallam) and there is no report of him prostrating in gratitude, Mālik says "...When something comes down to you that you do not recognise, put it aside." It is a fascinating insight in to his legal mind. The work examines his legal method with reference to different sources, for example his interpretation and use of consensus and his "tool kit" which consisted of four primary legal instruments; analogy (qiyās), discretion (al-istiḥsān), preclusion (sadd al-dharā'ī') and the unstated good (al-masāliḥ al-mursala) and how he utilised his "took kit" in comparison to other jurists as well as an examination of the terms he uses in his work and what he meant when he used them. Though you cannot relate to some of the examples given (i.e. marriage annulment by mutual cursing, defining lands suitable for shared-profit farm labour etc.) and the sheer number may be overwhelming, it nonetheless delivers on establishing Mālik's methodology clearly and concisely.It is important to appreciate that Mālik did not regard the totality of Medinese praxis as constituting a "living sunna", something that those whom oppose his methodology contend with, for example, Abū Yūsuf Ya'qūb ibn Ibrāhīm's (d. 182/798) polemic is based on his contention that the praxis cannot be verified as the source cannot be identified but he did not however attack Medinese claim to consensus. This is explored in detail taking and discussing the views of those who advocate the School as well as those that oppose it and the reasons for their position. Mālik did not blindly subscribe to Medinese praxis simply because it was the customary practice of the common people of Madina rather his criterion was based on its endorsement by Medinese scholars, a point some may have overlooked.There is a wealth of information in this book. It is the definitive work in the English language discussing the legal reasoning of Mālik. It also adds to any previous work about the man Mālik was and his thought-process with reference to the other three Schools of Thought i.e. the Ḥanafī, Shāfiʿī and Hanbālī Schools. The author points out that despite their often stringent disagreements, neither camp was ever at war with the other. It is a very informative work and uncovers the methodology applied by Mālik and compares it to his contemporaries as well as those that came after him. Even though the aim of the book is to reshape the way scholars analyse Islamic legal origins, it is of benefit to anyone interested in expanding their learning about the School of Madina and the great imam whom inherited the knowledge, preserved it, disseminated it and has his name attached to it, Mālik ibn Anas, may Allāh be pleased with him.

This is an excellent analytic study of the applied reasoning of Mālik ibn Anas (d.179/795) as principally found in his Muwaṭṭaʾ and in the Mudawwana of Saḥnūn 'Abd al-Salām ibn Saʿīd (d. 240/854). It is primarily concerned with Medinese praxis (`amal) though it is also a comparative study of early Islamic reasoning; bringing to light the legal reasoning of Mālik's Kufan contemporary al-Nuʿmān ibn Thābit Abū Ḥanīfa (d.150/767) as well as that of Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shāfiʿī (d.204/820) and Ahmad ibn Hanbāl (d.241/855), who both belonged to the generation after Mālik.The main body of the work is divided in to two parts, "Mālik and the Medinese Tradition" and "Mālik's Terminology in the Muwaṭṭaʾ and the Mudawwana". The first part explores the personality of Mālik, his teachers, his works and his legal reasoning. This includes his use of the Qu'rān, the different types of ḥadīth, the Sunna, his view on consensus, legal regional customs and his use of inference, discretion, preclusion and the unstated good as well his utilisation of considered opinion and analogical reasoning. The first section ends with a very detailed exposition of the critiques of Medinese praxis as well as the perspective of the advocates of Medinese praxis. The second part of the work investigates the terms Mālik uses and what he himself said about his terminology. For example it begins with the sunna-terms i.e. when Mālik says "the sunna among us about which there is no dissent", "the sunna that has been long established", "the sunna among the Muslims" etc. There are numerous examples covering each specific term and how and when Mālik refers to them and utilises them as part of his reasoning in establishing inherited precedents. The same approach is then taken with terms referring to the People of Knowledge in Madina, affirmative praxis terms, negative praxis terms, amr-terms and so on, again replete with numerous examples to demonstrate his position and further your understanding of his usage of these terms.The work is well referenced and the footnotes are excellent and expand on important points that add to the detailed discussion demonstrating what Mālik conceived Medinese practice to be, how he determined its authenticity, and the methods by which he applied it in positive law. Dr. Wymann-Landgraf challenges the universally assumed acceptance that Medinese consensus (ijmā' ahl al-Madīna) and local practice are coextensive. He also points out that considered opinion (ra'y) was a praiseworthy attribute and not a derogatory term as it may be viewed today. In actual fact, one of Mālik's foremost teachers, Rabī'at al-Ra'y ibn Abī `Abd al-Raḥmān Farrūkh (d.136/753) took his epithet from the sophisticated use of the technique. He even points out that the categorisation of Kufan jurists into the "proponents of considered opinion" (ahl al-ra'y) and the Medinese into the "proponents of tradition" (ahl al-ḥadīth) is historically inaccurate and misleading. In reality Abū Ḥanīfa was, surprisingly, more textually deferential and ḥadīth-orientated than Mālik and this view is established throughout the book where applicable. It makes for an insightful read of the formative period and the tools employed by the great legal minds that codified the approach to the sources that constitute Islamic law as passed down to us today.There are many fascinating facets of the life of Mālik which this work brings to light. He was aware of the dissenting opinions and took active interest in them and would sometimes modify his personal legal opinions in light of the dissenting positions of other jurists, including those from Kufa. As many know, he is well known for his response "I don't know" and this cautious approach is demonstrated in his careful choosing of those from whom he took his knowledge. It is reported by `Abd Allah ibn Wahb ibn Muslim (d. 197/812) that Mālik commented that he has met in Medina those whose prayers would be answered and they received much knowledge and many ḥadīth but because they were taken in by excessive fear of God and asceticism they were not authoritative sources of knowledge. This is because he said this business of juristic pronouncement requires mindfulness of God, caution and understanding as to perceive what is coming out of your head and these very peopled lacked this perfection. When Mālik died seven chests of the ḥadīths collected by Muḥammad ibn Muslim ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī (d. 124/742) were found in his house. This further supports the belief that Mālik refrained from transmitting all the ḥadīth he knew just as he said he refrained from sharing what he learnt under Ibn Hurmuz. Of all the imams, none had more students from as widely diverse regional backgrounds as Mālik and this helped spread the School.In terms of Mālik's methodology and that generally of the Mālikī School with regard to fiqh, this work is very informative. Mālik's approach to the law was rational and pragmatic and applied in a manner consistent with the Medinese tradition as demonstrated in this work. For both Mālik and Abū Ḥanīfa, who both accepted connected and disconnected ḥadīths as well as post-Prophetic reports as valid sources for ascertaining the legal content of the sunna, knowledge of the sunna was the criterion against which ḥadīths were judged, interpreted, accepted or rejected and not the reverse. In the Mālikī School it connotes the Prophet's (ṣallā Allāhu ʿalayhi wasallam) normative example opposed to his exceptional precedents. It is interesting to see how this authenticity was gauged by Mālik in comparison to other jurists hence his comments with reference to solitary ḥadīths, "I do not know what the reality of this ḥadīth is", "We do not know what the proper explanation of it is" and more specifically in terms of his methodology, "This ḥadīth has come down to us, but the praxis is not in accordance with it." You will then find examples given by Dr. Wymann-Landgraf of this process. For instance, the solitary ḥadīth referring to the validity of a marriage with the presence of a guardian has been rejected as obligatory by Abū Ḥanīfa, though the ḥadīth is sound. Mālik however upheld it as a prerequisite, though he didn't accept the ḥadīth alone but accepted it because it agreed with Medinese praxis which is how Mālik assessed the legal implications of solitary ḥadīth. Another example would be Mālik's rejection of the prostration of gratitude which was attributed to Abū Bakr as-Șiddīq (d. 12/634), who after being made victorious in a battle is reported to have prostrated to God in gratitude. He rejected it as fabricated because many victories came to the Prophet (ṣallā Allāhu ʿalayhi wasallam) and there is no report of him prostrating in gratitude, Mālik says "...When something comes down to you that you do not recognise, put it aside." It is a fascinating insight in to his legal mind. The work examines his legal method with reference to different sources, for example his interpretation and use of consensus and his "tool kit" which consisted of four primary legal instruments; analogy (qiyās), discretion (al-istiḥsān), preclusion (sadd al-dharā'ī') and the unstated good (al-masāliḥ al-mursala) and how he utilised his "took kit" in comparison to other jurists as well as an examination of the terms he uses in his work and what he meant when he used them. Though you cannot relate to some of the examples given (i.e. marriage annulment by mutual cursing, defining lands suitable for shared-profit farm labour etc.) and the sheer number may be overwhelming, it nonetheless delivers on establishing Mālik's methodology clearly and concisely.It is important to appreciate that Mālik did not regard the totality of Medinese praxis as constituting a "living sunna", something that those whom oppose his methodology contend with, for example, Abū Yūsuf Ya'qūb ibn Ibrāhīm's (d. 182/798) polemic is based on his contention that the praxis cannot be verified as the source cannot be identified but he did not however attack Medinese claim to consensus. This is explored in detail taking and discussing the views of those who advocate the School as well as those that oppose it and the reasons for their position. Mālik did not blindly subscribe to Medinese praxis simply because it was the customary practice of the common people of Madina rather his criterion was based on its endorsement by Medinese scholars, a point some may have overlooked.There is a wealth of information in this book. It is the definitive work in the English language discussing the legal reasoning of Mālik. It also adds to any previous work about the man Mālik was and his thought-process with reference to the other three Schools of Thought i.e. the Ḥanafī, Shāfiʿī and Hanbālī Schools. The author points out that despite their often stringent disagreements, neither camp was ever at war with the other. It is a very informative work and uncovers the methodology applied by Mālik and compares it to his contemporaries as well as those that came after him. Even though the aim of the book is to reshape the way scholars analyse Islamic legal origins, it is of benefit to anyone interested in expanding their learning about the School of Madina and the great imam whom inherited the knowledge, preserved it, disseminated it and has his name attached to it, Mālik ibn Anas, may Allāh be pleased with him.

Fantastic book , arrived prior to delivery date