Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan

Hasegawa has produced what will probably be the defining history of the end of WWII barring any new revelations. While he draws heavily on the work of Dower and Frank, he also includes more recently released information on what occurred in the final days of that war. He outlines the mistakes the Allies in general and America in particular, made and the opportunities lost. He does let personal opinion get in the way of factual presentations at times but his opinions are educated and worth consideration by any student of that era. The four islands north of Hokkaido that Russia took after the war ended could have been American outposts for keeping any eye on USSR naval activities if America had put people on those islands. And America's failing to put occupation officials on the ground in Japan for nearly two weeks after the surrender allowed Japanese military leaders time to destroy a significant amount of information that would have resolved unknowns that exist to this day. This book is definitely worth reading if the history of that period interests you.

If you want to know the real reason that Japan surrendered to end WWII, you will find the best case for the best answer in this superb book. By August 9, 1945, virtually all of Japan's cities were in ruins because of months of bombing by the US. The US dropped its atomic bombs on August 6 and August 9. Americans have long been told that those last two attacks were the reason for Japan's surrender. There was another development that is not typically included in our history lessons, however--the entry of the Russian army into the Pacific theater on August 9 against Japanese forces in China. The Russian threat to lightly defended northern Japan caused a crisis for Japan's senior leadership and the emperor that could not be ignored if Japan was to remain intact in any acceptable form. Better to surrender to the US than to risk the loss of the northern islands of Japan to the Russians forever.

Hasegawa has written a great book, but there are enough caveats to his analyses, that I cannot award the book a full 5 stars. I think that Richard B. Frank's Downfall is more persuasive in his interpretations about the role of atomic weapons and Soviet entry, and I find Frank's thoughts (look for the H-diplo roundtable discussion online for Frank on Hasegawa) to usually be the ones I find most persuasive. Hasegawa has done some excellent research into this period, and his insights into the Soviet sphere are especially illuminating. He also is admirably clear in what his views are and why he thinks what he does.First, a brief overview of Hasegawa's thesis and what the book is about. This is about the decisions that the Japanese, Americans, and Soviets made leading up to Japan's surrender in September 1945. Hasegawa maintains that Stalin and Truman raced to see who could force Japan's surrender first. In doing so, he gives a good overview of the situation in 1944-1945, and follows the political maneuvering in the USSR, the US, and in Japan itself. He has a good amount of focus on Truman's motivations, including revenge for Pearl Harbor. Stalin's motivations are to grab as much territory as possible from the Japanese. The Japanese wish to not accept an unconditional surrender that would change their political system greatly.My greatest criticism is that Hasegawa often seems to have decided that his supposition that Truman didn't want the Soviets to enter the war (so he could force surrender by himself) is taken to be true, and he finds ways of reading Truman so that this seems plausible. I think that Truman's actions are far more ambiguous and find the criticism of some sources being displayed with too much bias to have some merit. Michael Kort's book review shows how Hasegawa's treatment of Truman's reaction to Soviet entry into the war suggests that Hasegawa reads too much into Truman's motivations [Hasegawa claims Truman was profoundly disappointed, but a look at the sources shows that Truman didn't appear to be disappointed at all, at least to me and Kort]. It's also odd that Hasegawa freely admits that the Truman administration didn't try to use China to stop Soviet entry into the war. If Truman was so determined to prevent Soviet entry, it seems like he should have jumped at the chance to prevent the Soviets by having the Chinese not come to an agreement with them.Hasegawa also agrees that the Japanese were not about to surrender if the US had just added that the emperor would be retained (so a conditional "unconditional surrender"). While Hasegawa laments that other possibilities for peace were not always pursued, he states "Without the twin shocks of the atomic bombs and Soviet entry into the war, the Japanese would never have accepted surrender in August." This seems key to me, as the earlier the surrender, the fewer people (mostly non-Japanese Asians) would die under Japanese occupation, and fewer Japanese would starve from a naval blockade and bombing campaign against Japanese railways. Frank makes a great case for this, and I still have not found anyone with a satisfactory reply.Hasegawa thinks that Soviet entry alone would have caused surrender before November 1, but in such a scenario the Soviets may have taken part of Hokkaido and been a part of the post-war occupation. It is difficult to believe this would have been a good thing for the Japanese, and may have meant more land under Soviet occupation than what actually happened. (The treatment of Japanese POWs by the Soviets does not inspire confidence that the Japanese in Hokkaido would have been treated well.)One other problem I find with Hasegawa's analysis is how he views atomic weapons. It is certainly true that atomic bombs are much more powerful, but the idea behind them is very similar to strategic bombing, and the decision to attack civilians is never discussed with this full context. It may be true that it is easier to kill lots of people with atomic weapons, but fire bombing and conventional bombing of cities is also quite effective, and the same rationale backs both of them: civilians are military targets because they allow the opposing military to continue fighting. This certainly does not justify dropping the atomic bombs, but I think acknowledging this, adds a bit more balance to the discussion. Also, Alex Wellerstein (of the nuclear secrecy blog) has some excellent articles on Truman and the bomb that make a pretty good case that Truman did not fully understand that Hiroshima was a civilian and military target. He seemed to think it was mostly a military target. This also offers an alternative interpretation to Truman's defense of the bombs afterward.Overall, I found the book enlightening, even if I found a lot to disagree with. Most of them are simply different interpretations of the same event, and I think for the most part Hasegawa does a good job explaining his view and justifying it as a possible or plausible explanation.I would still recommend Frank's Downfall for an overview in general. Hasegawa's analysis of the Soviets is what really sets this book apart.

A brilliant analysis that not only fills in the many blank spots that existed with regard to the end of the war in the PTO, but also for the first time offers a complete and concise narrative of the decision making process simultaniously going on at all three major players. Hasegawa convincingly argues that it were not the atomic bombs that made Japan surrender (they were even resigned to receiving more of the same - testament to the effectiveness of LeMay's conventional bombing campaign, which in Tokyo alone killed more people in one night than died at Hiroshima ), but the prospect of Soviet occupation and the specter of communism. Faced with that alternative, the emperor rather preferred to surrender to the Americans.Truman tried to keep the Soviets out by dropping the bombs early but failed to appreciate that a modification of the unconditional surrender terms regarding the status of the emperor might have accelerated Japan'surrender more than the bombs would do.A must read for anyone interested in the history of WWII and/or the atomic bomb.

Hasegawa destroys the myth that dropping the bomb was Truman's only option in the closing stages of the Second World War. Truman could have included the Soviet Union in the Postdam Declarartion thereby ending Japanese hopes that the Soviets could act as a neutral power in designing a peace settlement. Or Truman had the option of allowing the emperor stay as a figurehead in the peace terms. Truman ignored these options and wanted to drop the atomic bomb in order to prevent the Soviets from entering the war. Also the author does not give a positive light on Stalin or the emperor, Stalin deceived the Japanese by stating that he was interested in peace in the Pacific while preapring for war and the emperor sided with the hardliners until the very end. As a previous reviewer mentioned it was the Soviet offensive in Manchuria that led to the Japanese capitulating and not the the atomic bomb. I would strongy reccomend this book to anyone who wants a new perspective on Truman.

A landmark three-way end of game played by Japan, the US and the USSR in 1945. What was until now told from the US perspective, is presented here not from a Japanese perspective, but really from the three belligerents. The decision-making of the political and military parties is very well analyzed — at least in Japan and the US, in the USSR the decision-making seems to rest with Stalin only. We can follow hour by hour how the various protagonists are reacting. The only criticism we can address to “Racing the Ennemy” is the lack of biographical notices: there are a lot of characters and one tends to get lost by places. Despite this slight note of caution, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa greatly improves our knowledge of the end of World War II. Particularly revealing is his appraisal of the importance of the Soviet offensive in Mandchuria, Sakhalin and the Kuril islands. It appears that the two atomic bombs launched by the US did not convince the Japanese leadership to surrender, the Soviet intervention was the key factor.

There is a great deal off talk and writing about what finally brought the war between Japan and the US to an end. In my opinion this book finally sets the record straight. The author is a Japanese man who is a professor of history at UCSB. The research he has done to support his thesis is stupendous. If you want to be informed about this period in our history, this is the book to read.

I kind of knew the subject of this book before buying it - but I am happy for the purchase - precise, to the point, and dealing with a very, very important issue. should be read by all students of WWII and the post-war world.

This was not large print as advertised. I especially bought it for my elderly father in law who needs large print. Now I am unable to return the package, which is not fair !