Japan's Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853-1945 (Modern War Studies Series) Hardcover – September 1, 2009

This is an excellent, scholarly work, providing the American reader with an overview of the the history of the Japanese Army and its role in the rise of Japan from the Meiji restoration through World War II. My only criticism is that the book should have been three times as long as its 262 pages, since there were many subjects and incidents that needed to be expanded. Therefore, it must be considered as a comprehensive overview with many subjects to be expanded through further reading by those interested. Please do not take this to mean this work is introductory, however, it is much more than that. One might also read other works like the venerable "The Chrysanthemum and the Sword" by Ruth Benedict to more fully comprehend the Japanese culture that gave rise and support to the army. Most history books pass over the Meiji Restoration as inevitable given the decadence of the Shogunate and the backwardness of Japan before Perry's appearance. Clearly, the restoration was by no means inevitable, and the military support given to it by two domains/provinces, Choshu and Satsuma, determined the makeup and leadership of the Army for many years thereafter. In Japanese culture, fighting was done by samurai, not by the common people, and indeed, it took some time before it was appreciated that individuals of common or humble origin could make good soldiers. The pattern of brutality in the army arose out of the culture with the assumption that the common soldier needed to be brutalized to become a good fighting man. In addition, the army belonged to the emperor, not the country, and a militaristic spirit was taught to the soldiers as well as the people. This fighting spirit was supposedly able to trump all adversity, including material deficiencies, and as an outgrown of that, logistics and other service emements in the Japanese Army were neglected and often failed in fulfilling their roles. Nonetheless, thirty-five years after the Meiji government began reorganizing the army, it was able to defeat a major European power, Russia. The text shows the difficulties in forming this army, which was more or less constantly in a state of re-organization the entire time. Officers were sent to French and German military schools for training, and European instructors were brought to Japan. Transforming small regional samurai forces relying on medieval weaponry into modern mass formations of trained common soldiers with substantial firepower and artillery was not easy to accomplish. But even by the Boxer Rebellion, Japanese detachments were proving their combat worth as equal to the Europeans. This book does not focus on the Japanese Navy which underwent similar teething problems and development. The army greatly impacted Japanese politics as a separate force, and the Army Minister held a position of importance far above what a similar title held in the West. In addition, younger army officers were always capable of rebelling in the name of the Emperor and for the good of the state, usually paying with their lives for their actions. But Prime Ministers were assassinated, and the army was able to bully its opposition. On top of that, junior officers could even start wars, like they did at the Marco Polo Bridge. The army was simply a state unto itself, with the power to dominate the government and take the nation into war as desired. Until after the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, the army leadership was undecided on whether it wanted Japan to be a regional power or a world power. Their preceived humiliation in the terms of Portsmouth led them to the latter course, a path that Japan had neither the population nor the material (including economic) resources to travel. Although the army prepared well for the next war with Russia, it became embroiled in a long war with China where their lack of population doomed their efforts at conquering China or winning a negotiated peace. Then the Navy pushed Japan into adopting a strategy of southern expansion -- a strategy for which the army was unprepared and could not fight. Although their armored formations were weak as compared to the Soviet Union's, the army had prepared for war with the Soviet Union rather than the United States. Against the US, their only chance was to cause the US sufficient casualties so that the American people would lose heart and call for their government to make peace (like they did over Vietnam.) Unfortunately for the Japanese, Pearl Harbor prevented that. All in all, this is an excellent book, subject to the limitations given above. I recommend it to all those readers interested in Japan or World War II.

I could begin this review saying that reading this book you will be able to understand why Japan has been able to win the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and the Russo - Japanese War (1904-05) and to lose WWII, but this book gives you much more , indeed it gives the IJA's most complete history that you can possibli find.The author explaines how happened the transition from the samurai's time to the imperial army, he gives you a complete account of all the rebellions and the attempted coups happened in the Japan's history since 1853.At the same time the author follows the IJA's technogical and tactical evolutions.He explaines how Japan got involved in the first Sino-Japanese War and how he won it, then he follows the birth and the development of the causes of the Russian-Japanese War and he shows all the problems and the failures met by the IJA before to effectively win this conflict.Then coming near to WWII, he is able to show how the IJA and the IJN (Imperial Japanese Navy) were not able to agree which would have been to be considered the next Japan's "true" enemy, indeed the IJA was thinking about Soviet Union, and the IJN was thinking about the USA, and because of the fact that in Japan it had never existed a political or militar control about both IJA and IJN, this question has never been solved , bringing to the absurd situation that both of them wanted an huge budget to fight, each, their own "true" enemy.So, Japan has been able to unify, even before the WWII's beginning in Europe, two groups very different groups of nations, as Soviet Union and USA and the British Empire, in an undeclared coalition against itself, when Japan began the long war against China (1931-1945).The book is full of first hand accounts, because of the author's access to a lot of diaries; the maps are detailed and relevant.The author brings to the discovery of an entire world, with its traditions, legends and myths.Very, very interesting and charming.

This book is excellent but for uncommon reasons. The book like the title infers covers the Japanese Army. It focuses heavily on events pre-WWII era. The book covers the impact of things like decisions, trends and wars. Through the coverage of the pre-events you will see the impact in Japanese fighting during WWII. This story will exhibit how organizational culture evolves. Any leader of a large organization will love this book for that. Decisions, budgets and priorities have impacts and at times for years later.An example is how the Japanese injected an overdoes of enthusiasm in to the organization. It took the form of bushido culture setting up standards of conduct for the individual soldier. That gave birth to the Kamikaze. It also justified or covered up the lack of equipment for the Army. The soldier bravery will compensate not having modern weapons. The book is very light on the events of WWII. You will have to look elsewhere for that information.

El libro explica el origen e historia del Ejército Imperial Japonés explicando antecedentes desde lo más básico. Recomendado para entender el porqué de acontecimientos de la SGM.

Very informative book!

hilfreiche Lektüre

Absolutely excellent book, very informative.

Der Autor Edward J. Drea ist US-amerikanischer Militärhistoriker, lehrt am Army War College und ist Leiter des Bereichs Forschung & Analyse des US Army Center for Military History. Vor allem aber beherrscht er die japanische Sprache in Wort und Schrift. So ist es hier nun endlich der Fall, dass ein westlicher Autor direkt und ohne Umwege aus den japanischen Quellen schöpft. Die mehr als 30 Seiten Anmerkungen sowie die umfangreiche Bibliographie dokumentieren dies eindrücklich.Drea hat jedoch kein Buch über die Kriege Japans geschrieben, sondern über die Armee Japans. Und damit sind in erster Linie die Landstreitkräfte gemeint, nicht die Marine. Eine gerade für die japanische Armee wichtige Unterscheidung.Das Werk beginnt mit den Samurai-Kriegen in den 60er und 70er - Jahren des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts. Aus den dort gemachten Erfahrungen entwickelte die japanische Armee ihre Doktrin und ihr Selbstverständnis - absolute Aufopferung für den Tenno, den gottähnlichen Kaiser, striktes Ablehnen von Rückzug oder Gefangennahme. Der Weg zum Sieg führte im Denken der japanischen Offiziere nur über den Angriff.Die nächsten Kapitel behandeln den chinesisch-japanischen und den russisch-japanischen Krieg sowie alle damit verbundenen Vorgänge und Veränderungen innerhalb der Streitkräfte. Japan geht aus beiden Auseinandersetzungen als Sieger hervor, die Armee ist hoch angesehen in der Bevölkerung und beginnt immer stärker, selbst Politik zu betreiben.Wir verfolgen nun die große Diskussion, die innerhalb Japans Armee fast zwei Jahrzehnte geführt wurde - schneller Angriffskrieg oder langandauernder Abnutzungskrieg? Die Erfahrungen des 1. Weltkrieges in Europa sprachen für Zweiteres - aber einen langen Krieg konnte Japan nicht durchhalten. Es fehlten ihm dafür die Bodenschätze, insbesondere Erdöl.Aus dieser Analyse heraus nahm das Verhängnis seinen Lauf - ab Anfang der Dreißiger-Jahre wurde die japanische Außenpolitik immer mehr zur Eroberungspolitik. Japan glaubte, sich seine eigene "Wohlstandssphäre" mit Waffengewalt sichern zu müssen. Dabei trieb die Armee die Politiker immer wieder vor sich her und provozierte u.a. den sogenannten "Zwischenfall auf der Marco Polo - Brücke" in der Nähe von Peking am 7. Juli 1937. Daraus entwickelte sich innerhalb kurzer Zeit der chinesisch-japanische Krieg, der ohne Unterbrechung bis zur Kapitulation Japans anhalten sollte und viele Millionen Menschenleben kostete.Unfähig, sich aus dem chinesischen Dilemma zu befreien und unter immer größeren Druck der USA, welche massive Wirtschaftssanktionen gegen Japan verhängen, sehen Armee und Marine schließlich im Überraschungsangriff auf Pearl Harbour im Dezember 1941 den "Befreiungsschlag".Doch das Gegenteil war der Fall:Dem Menschen- und Wirtschaftsgiganten USA hatte Japan, welches zu diesem Zeitpunkt bereits etwa eine Million Mann im Krieg gegen China einsetzte, mittelfristig nichts entgegenzustellen. Im September 1945, nach Millionen Toten, der Verwüstung praktisch aller japanischen Großstädte und zwei Atombomben, kapitulierte Japan bedingungslos.Die japanische Armee war zerstört. In Erinnerung blieb vor allem die Grausamkeit und Brutalität der japanischen Soldaten in China und auf den Pazifik-Schlachtfeldern des 2. Weltkrieges. Gänzlich unbekannt ist hingegen, wie gut Japan russische Kriegsgefangene 1905 oder deutsche Kriegsgefangene im Ersten Weltkrieg behandelte. So, wie auch vieles andere über diese so unheimliche Streitmacht in der westlichen Welt entweder völlig unbekannt ist, oder falsch interpretiert wurde.Durch dieses bahnbrechende, von vielen japanischen Spezialisten unterstützte Werk, bekommt der militärhistorisch interessierte Leser die Hintergründe dafür geliefert, warum wann wer was wie entschied.Die Intrigen und Machenschaften, Konkurrenzkämpfe und Eitelkeiten, Manipulationen und Fehden innerhalb der japanischen Generalität sind dabei manchmal kaum zu glauben. Ein spannender Trip durch etwa 100 Jahre blutige Weltgeschichte, ausufernd recherchiert, auf das Wesentliche konzentriert.Einziges Manko - das schwache Kartenmaterial und das Fehlen von Fotos bedeutender Persönlichkeiten.Doch auf jeden Fall sehr empfehlenswert.