The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I

Grotelueschen has written the best book so far at describing the way that the AEF functioned during the First World war. Groteluechen believes that AEF commaders at the lower level ignored Pershings advice about open warfare and practiced more of a European combined arms approach with set set piece attacks that used massive amounts of artillery. The 1st division almost constantly used European type tactics beginning with the defense of Cantigny and ending with the Meuse Argonne offensive. The 26th division used European methods but soon fell apart due to bad leadership and lack of replacements. The 2nd division at first adopted Pershings open warfare doctrine but changed its approach after suffering a large amount of losses in the summer of 1918, and it soon became effective once John Lejeune took over and implemented a doctrine based upon set piece attacks. Finally the 77th division practiced European warfare even though its commander, Robert Alexander, was a firm advocate of Pershings open warfare doctrine. The only weakness of this book is that Grotelueschen leaves out the 42nd and 35th divisions that were less successful in combat, nevertheless this is an excellent book at describing how the AEF operated in the First World War.

The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I by Mark Ethan Grotelueschen This fine book is a comprehensive and surprisingly readable survey of how the US Army's American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) trained and fought in the First World War. Considered worthy of inclusion in the Army Chief of Staff's recommended reading list, Dr. Grotelueschen describes the process the Army underwent to prepare for a type of combat it had no experience with, how it trained and how it fought. Much ink has been spilled discussing and even denigrating the combat performance of the AEF and, indeed, the first battles fought by the Americans exposed both their inexperience and their unsuitable combat doctrine. As the war progressed, and the American soldiers (plus a Marine Brigade) learned both from their allies and their own experiences to become as adept as their British and French partners, as well as the Germans. After describing the doctrinal disputes, the author thoroughly examines the training and fighting done by four divisions: the 1st, 2nd, 26th and 77th, to more closely analyze how they coped. The pre-WWI American Army was tiny: less than 200,000 men. During most of its recent history it had fought Indians, Filipino guerrillas and Mexican bandits. Its battle doctrine (how it intended and prepared to fight) was human-centered, touting the rifle and bayonet-armed infantryman as the vital component of victory, based on the supposed American proclivity for rapid maneuver and "national talent" for shooting rifles, like Davy Crockett or Kit Carson. Pershing, who was a strong believer in this stuff, thought the Europeans had settled into trench warfare and stalemate because they were shy. But the Yanks would somehow be above all that. Groups of rifle armed infantry would used rapid movement to outflank and somehow overwhelm their heavily dug-in and armed-to-the-teeth opponents with massed rifle fire and finish them off with a bayonet charge. Very little supporting firepower would be used. At first, the Americans tried fighting this way and found out what their French and British allies had discovered 2 1/2 years before. They had also originally intended to fight this way, only to massacre their own infantry, and that the war was a war of machines. World War I on the Western Front was essentially an artillery war, and even Pershing realized that his units would have to adapt, or at least, master trench warfare before they could force the Germans into the open. The changes were carried out from the bottom-up, with help from the allies, especially the French, who trained and equipped the Americans' artillery. The American infantry also adapted by acquiring additional organic firepower as in machine guns, automatic rifles, grenade launchers, light support artillery, trench mortars and hand grenades, though Pershing would dismissively refer to such weapons as "auxiliaries." The better units, like the 1st and 2nd Divisions became adept at the vital art of coordinating infantry and artillery to carry out attack that didn't kill off their soldiers, no simple matter in the era before wireless signals and on a battlefield where the life of a message carrying runner could be measured in minutes. Artillery tactics mattered; no successful attack was carried out in the latter part of the war without a rolling barrage, combined high-explosive and gas attacks to suppress enemy artillery, and long-range destruction of the opponent's rear installations. The units depicted in the narrative reflect the mixed historical roots of the US Army. 1st and 2nd Divisions were “Regular Army” and, as such were composed of long-standing regiments, even if the vast majority of the soldiers had served less than a year. The 2nd was probably the best and most experienced outfit in Pershing’s army and was unique in the inclusion of a Marine Brigade and that the division CO would eventually be Lejeune, a USMC general (and future Commandant). The 26th was a National Guard outfit, built around units from New England (some of which dated back to the War of 1812), but the CO was controversial and would eventually be relieved, while the division itself was probably the victim of anti-Guard bias on the part of the Regulars, who suspected (not always unjustifiably) that rank and positions in the Guard were based on political connections. The 77th was National Army, a hostilities-only outfit, recruited mostly from the various neighborhoods of New York City; it was common in the division to refer to platoons as ‘gangs.’ Some bright soul at Pershing’s HQ assigned the most densely wooded section of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive to the 77th, and it suffered accordingly. The 77th was, in fact, the parent unit of the famed Lost Battalion in that battle. Dr. Grotelueschen’s well-written narrative, after examining the Army’s pre-war doctrines, takes us through the training and combat experiences of those divisions in turn. What becomes apparent is that the units did as well as could be expected for green troops in what was essentially a green army. It is also clear that, had the war continued into 1919 as almost everyone thought it would, the American contribution would have been massive, but their very presence on the battlefield in 1918 helped end the war when it did. If the role of the AEF or WWI tactics and training interest you, you’ll find much to enjoy here.

Good solid analysis of AEF on the tactical level. As a Connecticut resident particularly was impressed on the chapters on the 26th Yankee division.

Mark Grotelueschen's balanced, nuanced assessment of American combat performance in World War I not only advances our understanding of the AEF but also sheds light on key aspects of contemporary military affairs. The not-so-simple process of learning in large military organizations ... the ambivalent role that training and hard-won experience play in shaping future combat performance ... how leaders take the ideas and concepts of doctrine and adapt (or fail to adapt) them to the often unexpected reality of the modern battlefield. All of these perennial issues receive careful, thoughtful treatment in Grotelueschen's well-structured study. In a readable blend of narrative and analysis, the author looks at the training and battlefield experiences of four U.S. divisions and, in particular, explores how these units each adapted their tactics and techniques over time and across a number of campaigns on the Western Front throughout the summer and fall of 1918. The tension between two competing "ways of war" takes center stage in Grotelueschen's interpretation. On the one hand, there was the trench warfare refined over a number of years by the British and French and characterized by tightly controlled set-piece attacks supported with heavy machine-gun fire and meticulously planned artillery barrages in order to secure limited objectives. In stark contrast stood the uniquely American style of open warfare preferred by the AEF's senior leaders. Open warfare minimized fire support in favor of mobility and unrestrained maneuver--a way of fighting thought to be best suited for the aggressive American infantryman and one that (according to its relentless and eager advocates) unleashed the incalculable moral force of rifle and bayonet. As it turned out, open warfare minimized common sense in favor of dogma. It proved to be a way of fighting at odds with reality and well beyond the capabilities of the relatively inexperienced AEF in any case. Almost from the start, American infantrymen doing the actual fighting knew better. Grotelueschen shows how, for the most part, units up to division level gradually shunned open warfare and its basically ineffective (and dangerous) tactics. Instead, from the bottom up, they adopted the methods of trench warfare with surprising--if mixed--success. The AEF Way of War is not another overview of World War I military operations. Grotelueschen's principal aim is to uncover the war of ideas taking place within the AEF's subordinate organizations. The author convincingly explains how units learned "to fight by fighting" and then adapted their tactics to meet the similar challenges of future campaigns.