Dragon Days: Time for "Unconventional" Tactics

An excellent work, I'd buy this again only for the country studies in each chapter. Poole does a great job gathering evidence and connecting the dots as China gathers its "String of Pearls" in the region. He doesn't stop there and offers a comprehensive plan for dealing with it. If only those in charge would take heed...

H. John Poole has a different look at what small units and the bigger picture should do to succeed and keep the US the super power it is.

Fantastic info! Kudos to Mr. Poole.

Great insight and analysis by John Poole. Sadly over the last 6 years we have tended to ignore the growing number of regions sliding into low level conflicts. Our attention span is limited due to a press that seems to be tired of little wars, a government which wants to pretend that they do not exist and a nation increasingly focused on a stalled economy.Poole offers a wealth of information, analysis and identification of what could and should be done to improve our approach , but too much falls on deaf ears.Highly recommended

ok

Well done

H. J. Poole, in DRAGON DAYS, turns attention to beating our opponents in "The War on Terror". His basic approach is to enforce International Law utilizing Unconventional military techniques. First, Poole addresses the question of whether or not the Red Chinese are involved in promulgating terror. Given that Afghanistan is proximal to its border, and that Pakistan has been a long time ally against its traditional foe India, Chinese involvement with Islamic radicals may well reflect their regard for their own interests. From a strictly national perspective, the Chinese are cogent to counter increasing U.S. and Indian influence in their own back yard. While radical Muslamic terrorists have their own agenda, Chinese involvement may not be based on ideological concerns. Indeed, a total U.S. disaster may mean that the Chinese won't receive a return on money borrowed from it by the U.S.(!) The "War on Terror" - is it a military struggle - or International Law enforcement? Here, Poole is on solid ground recommending, in the second section of his book, that the U.S. and its allies approach terrorism in a law-and-order context. A relevant illustration is a recent event in Indonesia: after a night club bombing that claimed the lives of several western tourists, as well as Indonesians', the Indonesian authorities brought the radical Islamic perpetrators to trial and subsequent conviction. Though largely a Muslim nation, Indonesia wasn't rocked by civil unrest after the terrorists were convicted. The techniques profiled in Poole's book are similar to those the TV viewer can find on "CSI" type programs. Poole rightly compares how a criminal case is pursued by the NYPD versus how a U.S. military unit would respond to a similar incident in Afghanistan or Iraq. Civil authorities in the "Big Apple" - and their elected representatives holding national office - would be justly outraged over military operations in New York City as these are conducted routinely in the Mid-East. Repercussions for such conduct would be swift - and career ending. International terrorism is a breach of International Law. When the international terrorist is regarded as the equivalent of the serial rape-murderer, rather than the representative of a just cause, all societies, Western, Eaastern, Muslim, developing world - all societies will pursue his elimination. Trial by World-recognized judicial authorities, based upon forensic evidence with internationally-agreed upon validity, is the surest means to undermine any moral authority of the terrorist. When Poole discusses small unit tactical operations, he is on his own turf in the final section of his book. While one may question his political analyses, there is no denying his experience and post military career tactical studies. The sources of Poole's tactical craft are Asian in origin. He relies heavily on North Vieetnamese/Viet Cong, Japanese Ninja and North Korean "Light Infantry Bureau" sources in his depiction of appropriate techniques, even providing the outline of a training program on "unconventional warfare". Poole holds that U.S. "Special Operators" need a different direction in their tactical techniques, and that these unconventional skills should be promulgated to the level of the common infantry units. He stresses the significance of tactical finesse at the squad level versus the large-unit operations favored by the U.S. Military establishment. He decries the unnecessary reliance upon technology and firepower at the expense of good field craft and tactical skills. While the applicability of his touted "flying column" assault may be questioned, the tactical competence required to execute it is one the U.S. ground forces should definitely seek to achieve. More astute readers may pay closer attention to Poole's focus on China's role and debate its applicability. There is room for a wide dispersion of viewpoints on these matters. Poole has presented his conclusions. Others may agree or disagree with him. His discussions in the tactical realm will doubtless draw more criticism: many western-inluenced military enthusiasts will, no doubt, decry his approach to "unconventional tactics". Certainly the U. S. Military establishment's predilection for hi-tech and lots of firepower aren't reflected in Poole's techniques. However, two aspects are to be noted: 1) The current conflict in Central Asia and the Mid-East call for a much more sophistacated law enforcement-cum-light infantry approach, especially when operating among a civilian population. Enraging this population is counter productive; and, as has been noted by other observers, the U.S. forces cannot "kill their way" out of their tactical problems. 2) If only at the outset of their employment, Poole's recommended "Unconventional Tactics" may just succeed, simply because our current foes would never expect a tech-heavy, firepower-reliant U.S. force to fight in such a manner.

AGAIN A WELL-RESEARCHED & DOCUMENTED BOOK WITH A THEME THAT CHINA IS AN ENEMY OF THE U.S. NOW & IN THE FUTURE.