Truth, Lies, and O-Rings: Inside the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster

I first heard about this book a few months ago at [...]. Indeed, the title seemed somewhat tabloid I would say as it was about as blunt as an anvil falling on Willie Coyote's head in a Road Runner cartoon. I had some reservations picking it up until I learned that one of the authors was James Hansen, a former NASA historian who is currently a history professor at Auburn University (and of course, writer of "First Man" about Neil Armstrong). McDonald was a bit of a wildcard as although I recalled his name from the Challenger investigation, this was his first book and I wasn't exactly sure how it would be written. But, I knew if Hansen was involved after reading First Man and its even handed portrayal of Neil, then the book had to be in good hands. James takes his responsibilities very seriously and he doesn't stick his name with a project unless he knows it can provide a proper insight into the historical perspective of people and events.Allan McDonald was both and engineer and manager working for Morton Thiokol on the space shuttle solid rocket booster program. He wasn't one of the individuals involved with the original design of the motor, but he was heavily involved during the ramp up of production after the shuttle's first test flights. Ironically it was his participation in the accident investigation of an explosion at one of the SRB propellant casting facilities that brought him into the shuttle SRB program. He became a program manager for the Filament Wound Casing SRBs being tested and built for shuttle launches from Vandenberg AFB (that program was cancelled after Challenger). He also became the chairman of the Senior Materials Review Board for the Solid Rocket Motors. This board was tasked with tracking all the discrepancies found in the SRB hardware both before, during and after use and Allan had to sign off on the recommendations to accept or reject hardware for use.Fast forward to January 27, 1986 with the very unusual meeting/teleconference between NASA SRB program managers and Morton Thiokol concerning the topic of launching in cold temperatures and how the cold might affect performance of the O-rings in the Solid Rocket Booster field joints. McDonald was there and gave his input (and rather vocally expressed both his concerns and doubts). He was a ground floor witness to what happened on both that night and the next day.Allan's book tells the story from before Challenger to after flights resumed with the redesigned SRB field joints. It documents very well the events that lead up to the destruction of the shuttle and both the investigations that took place as well as the Rogers Commission hearings (both in front of and behind the scenes). It was Allan's testimony that focused attention on the field joints as well as the January 27 teleconference.In this book you get it all from his perspective. Indeed he took very thorough notes at the time of Challenger as he wanted to make sure he got his story straight. It was revealed in the brief mini-biography of McDonald at the end (written by James Hansen) that he studied pre-law at Eastern Montana College before pursuing engineering instead. His brother John went on to become a law professor. As such, I have a feeling that those classes prepared him somewhat for how he handled himself during those long months of investigation and testimony.He certainly pulls no punches as he has things to say about both the NASA managers at the Marshall Spaceflight Center and his own bosses at Morton Thiokol (and a couple members of Congress who tried to grandstand a bit for their own political gain). The entire Challenger affair got Allan labeled a "whistleblower" and it affected his career somewhat. But, he did stick around and was very instrumental in the re-design of the solid rocket motor field joints. Those redesigned joints continue to be used today in the shuttle program and elements are intended for use in the Solid rocket motors designed for the Ares program.Some might wonder if Allan really is the truth telling champion he comes off as in the book. But many of his co-workers and colleagues from that time say he is indeed that way. Looking at the advance praise quotations on the back of the book should give you a glimpse into that as two come from the a pair of the most highly regarded astronauts in the space program (Hoot Gibson and John Young). John Young very rarely associates his name with ANYTHING unless it is a quality product. It also gets back to why James Hansen got involved as well.What I took away from this title was a few things. First, people talk about trying to fool Mother Nature, but the laws of physics can be even more cruel if you try to play Russian Roulette with them. "CYA" can't overcome what engineering data is saying and if lives are on the line, what the data is saying becomes far more critical then a person, company or agency's reputation. I also took from this title that there are indeed still honest people out there, ones willing to put their reputations on the line to speak out if they don't think something is right. Honesty and integrity are two values we don't hear about much these days as it seems some very shallow people tend to command the news headlines. Allan also has a very healthy sense of humor too. Read "The Green Ball Theory" and you'll get the idea. If this theory can make a Nobel Prize winning physicist laugh, it must be good.I recommend this book to anyone who has an interest in the space and shuttle programs, or complex engineering projects. Studying the failures and accidents in the space program are just as important as studying the successes, otherwise we could be doomed to repeat them or have similar failures. I feel this book should also be required reading for engineering students. Granted not all engineers will end up working on something as critical as hardware for the space program. But there are lessons to be learned here as well.For those that don't have a formal education in engineering, the book can drag a little at the beginning. But I urge you to keep reading as what is written in those early chapters has direct bearing on what comes later. In my own case, although I have researched the shuttle program extensively, this book explained to me clearly how the solid rocket motor field joints operated. In fact when I picked up the book, I couldn't put it down as I spent most of a weekend reading it from cover to cover. This is why I give the title five stars.

The explosion of NASA's Space Shuttle "Challenger" on January 28, 1986, with the loss of seven astronauts, is like the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. No one who saw the tragic event on live television will ever forget where he or she was at the time. A government-industry team soon determined that unusually cold temperatures at the Cape the night before liftoff prevented O-rings in the aft field joint of the Morton Thiokol Inc. (MTI) right-hand Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) from properly sealing. Hot gases blew past the faulty seals, eroded a hole in the motor case and doomed the Shuttle and its unsuspecting crew.In the 20-plus years since the disaster, many books on the subject have appeared, written by reporters, scholars and even a former NASA employee, with varying levels of detail and technical accuracy. "Truth, Lies and O-Rings" is different. Author Allan J. McDonald, who at the time was MTI's Director of the Shuttle SRM Project, was at the Cape when the Shuttle lifted off, and he watched in horror as it disintegrated 50,000 feet over the Atlantic in the clear Florida sky 73 seconds later. Mr. McDonald knew for certain that the O-rings in the field joint would seal more slowly--or perhaps would not seal at all--when they were cold. He was one of only two people who had spoken out against launching, to his own managers and to NASA managers, during a meeting the night before. His book relates, in great detail and with many new, revealing insights, his personal story of how the "Challenger" disaster happened and how it changed his life. In particular, it sheds light on one of the biggest issues surrounding the flawed decision to launch on that cold winter day--why did MTI first recommend against launching, then change to a "GO" recommendation?Using transcripts from testimonies at the Presidential Commission that investigated the disaster, and drawing on thousands of pages of his own handwritten notes from the investigation, Mr. McDonald spares no detail in telling how and why "Challenger" failed. Quoting from the Commission hearing records, he shows how NASA and MTI managers first tried to cover up their irresponsible actions, then tried to discredit him. These verbatim testimonies add a sense of immediacy to what might otherwise be a dry technical narrative. Exceptionally well-written, "Truth, Lies and O-Rings" draws the reader along inexorably as the story progresses.If you're interested in learning the excruciating details of what really happened to "Challenger," and why, and how the problems were corrected, then read this book. It is certainly the definitive treatment available today, and will likely remain so for a long time. By the way, an exceptionally valuable bonus is a 25-page Bibliographic Essay in which co-author James Hansen reviews and critiques virtually all of the other books available on the subject. Own them all if you can, but if you only own one, make it "Truth, Lies and O-Rings."

I bought the kindle edition after seeing the BBC film "Challenger"- wanting to know more about Allan McDonald and his story. This book is as detailed as you would expect from an engineer whose care and rigour at his job is obvious. You are plunged right into the heart of the daily grapple with issues of the re-usable hardware in the solid rocket boosters (blowby, erosion, putty, tang clevis field joint and of course dreaded temperature issues). What is glaringly obvious as you see the teams (engineers of MTI NASA etc) working their socks off to meet the next launch review is just how hard they were all working. Two launches a month was never going to be achievable and you feel the ominous overload on man as well as the machines.The contrast between engineering rigour and the corporate pressures is grindingly painful. A loyal employee starts to say and do things his bosses colleagues and key customer do not want him to. His confusion and pain is gripping stuff.I would have given this 5stars but Allan's written style is clunky and long winded at times. But it his voice that your hear: picky, tenacious, professional, and above all a shining rigour to laws of physics and principles of good design. And if you don't have at least A- level science you will find much of this unreadable. But do stay with the detail (and the slightly lumpy sentence structures): you can immerse yourself in the intricacy and sheer complexity of the data and double speak arguments that came out after the event.Being put in charge of the redesign of the rocket boosters after Challenger shows what an extraordinary man Allan is. No wonder his astronaut friends in the orbiter wanted him at launch control when in 1988, the shuttle took to the air again. A memoir that rings with integrity.

If you are interested in the cause of the loss of the Challenger Space Shuttle then this is the book to read. It is a lengthy examination of the background and lead up, as well as the events as they happened and the subsequent investigations that led to comprehensive redesign of the solid rocket motor as told by someone intimately involved with all facets of these operations.Given the story is intimately interwoven around human difference, with all of its complications, makes me feel the tale gains even more than if it were just limited to technical analysis. In particular here is the role of honesty, for it takes courage to stand up and tell it like it is when all those around you, people you know and are even friends with, are doing their best to tell it differently. Indeed it soon become apparent that following the setting up of Commission by President Reagan to investigate the tragedy, its appointees had their work cut out to get at the heart of the matter because critical information as related by senior NASA representatives and the hierarchy of Morton Thiokol was presented in manner short on being clear. It is not stretching the case to state that if it were not for the voice of Mr MacDonald, with support from Roger Boisjoly, then perhaps the real cause of the disaster may have been partially camouflaged, with all this would have meant to the future of the Space Shuttle.Inevitably there is a price to pay for those who follow this route, this account relates the strains and stresses that deeply affected both Mr Boisjoly and Mr MacDonald, though in widely differing ways. Fortunately support was forthcoming at the highest level that offered both protection and help for both of this men, so allowing Mr MacDonald in particular, who proved personally strong and robust despite experiencing some resentment for having spoken out, to effectively lead the successful re-design of the solid rocket motor and so ensure the future success of the Shuttle following its return to service.A truly outstanding book. Perhaps the best I have read for some time, certainly it is written as well as some of Bill Gunston's work, I can think of no better accolade for a largely technical work.

McDonald and his hapless friend produce a book that desperately tries to justify the author’s silence after the launch decision and his supportive secondary seal remarks. Also he was in charge of the Srm team at the cape and only after the accident tried to lock onto seal temperatures. hundred pages to try and squirm out of it be personally castigating others. Hanson’s essay at the end is a crude attempt to demolish other excellent books on challenger so that this myopic one man’s self justifying can be exalted.

A great account by McDonald who was a Thiokol insider. It’s often sad and bleak but has all the detail you need on that tragic event in which 7 astronauts lost their lives due to NASA’s arrogance and blindness. It’s quiet technical too so this may deter and bore the lay person who likes a more sensational disaster story. It’s a big and heavy read but definitely takes you to the heart of the matter.

This provides a fascinating and detailed insight into the Challenger Space Shuttle disaster of 1986. Morton Thiokol manufactured the solid state motors for the shuttle launches and A.J.McDonald was their senior engineer at the launch. The night before, he recommended that the launch be abandoned over concerns that the ambient temperature was way below that which was deemed safe because of the likely failure of the 'O' rings. Eventually, Thiokol management, under pressure from NASA, overruled the recommendation of all of their top engineers and seven lives were lost. McDonald kept detailed notes of everything that happened before and after the disaster, including evidence taken by The Rodgers Commission.His book recalls how, initially, he was sidelined by NASA, Thiokol management and colleagues. Ultimately, however, through sticking to his convictions, he became something of a hero within his profession and amongst the astronauts and was responsible for the successful redesign of the motor joints that had failed.It is a well written account although, inevitably, very wordy and full of detail that, however, did not detract from my enjoyment. McDonald was the whistle blower who showed that, with determination, honesty could prevail.