Operation I-Go: Yamamoto'S Last Offensive - New Guinea and the Solomons April 1943 Paperback – 1 July 2020

Operation I-Go was Admiral Yamamoto's last hurrah, a a series of air attacks designed to administer a major blow that would blunt the Allied advances in the Pacific. Combining air units at Rabaul with carrier-based units, Yamamoto unleashed attacks in April 1943 against shipping and airfields on Guadalcanal, Oro Bay, Port Moresby and Milne Bay. Michael Claringbould chronicles those attacks in this comprehensive, thoroughly-researched and well-illustrated 2020 Avonmore Books release.I-Go was a failure, the attacks being ineffective with Japanese aircrews reporting highly-inflated claims of Allied ships destroyed and aircraft downed. Claringbould examines the development of the I-Go plan and then dissects each attack from both sides and its ultimate failure. It is a fascinating story well-told.All of Claringbould's book are required reading for fans of the Pacific air war. Over the decades, western authors have claimed Japanese loss records were destroyed but, according to Claringbould, those records are "available, detailed and accurate." Using them, he paints a vastly different story of the Pacific air war, documenting the overclaiming done by Allied - and Japanese - aircrews. In some cases, the claims versus losses are incredible and make most previous Pacific air war books suspect and in need of revision.Operation I-Go and all Claringbould's books are must reading. Highly recommended.

A very well / deeply researched book that almost over-focus's on every minute detail of the air campaign that the title eludes too. For the real air enthusiast only, as opposed to a good read for those not so interested in the minute details.

The book gives an amazingly detailed account of the four days of Japanese aerial attacks against Guadalcanal, Milne Bay, Oro Bay, and Port Moresby in April of 1943. It describes the Japanese unit involved, the US and Australian defending air units, and the results (almost negligible) of the attacks. Both the Japanese and the Americans greatly exaggerated the losses each supposedly inflicted on the other. The Japanese claims were more so than the Americans; the Japanese admirals thought they had won a great victory, although the lower-level commanders knew better. I would give the book a 4-or 5-Stars rating for the level of detail provided.The reason I gave it a 3-Stars rating is because the entire offensive Japanese effort had no affect the US advance up the Solomons or on New Guinea. It was simply insignificant. At the time (per page 129), the US and Australian forces and commanders involved didn’t even realize that the Japanese attacks were anything unusual. The actual airplane losses weren’t spectacular at all: 30 Allied airplanes and 45 Japanese.The Japanese aerial assaults were very well planned and executed. Staff work was excellent. They just didn’t accomplish anything. The entire attack, in many respects, was typical of Japanese short-term and overall erroneous military thinking: the war would be won by a single large-scale naval or air attack (“Decisive Battle”).The final chapter “Postscript” provides an excellent overall critique of the I-GO operation and its consequences.

Liked the information on unusual Zero colour schemes.

Michael Claringbould knows his stuff. The book is very well written and the maps, photos and aircraft profiles all add to the incredible text.