Operation Sea Lion

Terrific read

This is a very detailed account of how Great Britain prepared for invasion and how the Germans planned to launch that invasion. The British side is given a great deal more attention then the German planning. In the process the author makes a good case for several myths that have sprung up about this period. Still, if you are interested in the several months between the battle for France and the beginning of the Blitz this book is definitely worthwhile. I have one complaint. The author cites a number of historians whose works do not appear in the bibliography.

If you’re a reader of WWII history, you’re well aware of the escape of the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk following the collapse of French lines in the early days of the war. But did you know that there was a second British Expeditionary Force that landed in France, ostensibly to bolster French resistance, almost immediately after the return of the first? And that the withdrawal of that force resulted in the sinking of a troopship and the death of over 7,000 soldiers, in the largest single British battle loss of the war? I certainly didn’t.Operation Sea Lion covers the period between the withdrawal of the second BEF from France and the Battle of Britain, a time when Britain was had suffered serious loss of men and equipment, and needed time to rebuild its forces, and the when Hitler was hoping that Britain would sue for peace, or better yet, would collapse from lack of food, lack of arms, and lack of will. Failing that, Germany would invade, in an operation code named Sea Lion. The British leadership expected such an invasion, and this book deals with both German planning for the invasion, and British defense against an invasion. It’s a compelling narrative, one that goes against much of the common wisdom regarding both German intent and British readiness.Some have contended that Sea Lion was never a serious plan, but McKinstry has documented a great many pieces of evidence that argue otherwise, including internal communications, occupation planning, invsion ship construction, and rehearsal held on the coasts of Europe. One widely held belief that is supported by McKinstry’s research is that’s such an invasion was doomed to failure, owing to insufficient German naval and air resources, the overwhelming power of the Royal Navy, and the depth of British planning for an invasion.One great resource was the British Home Guard. Often ridiculed as “Dad’s Army,” a hopeless, ill-equipped collection of doddering seniors and misfits typified by the BBC comedy series of the same name, the real Home Guard was a very professional, well trained army made up largely of First World War veterans with combat experience. They had good uniforms, and were armed with Pattern 1917 Enfield rifles that had equipped the US Army in the First World War. The Enfield (not the Springfield) was the primary small arm of US troops in the First World War, and was of the same vintage as the Lee-Enfield MkIII carried by front line Army soldiers.McKinstry has written an excellent history of that period, one that dispels a good many popular but incorrect beliefs, and one that provides insight and detail into many lesser known details.

After reading about half the book I am somewhat disappointed so far. It's pretty much completely lopsided toward the British side with few meaningful details on the German side. There is also much repetition on the efforts at defense along the British Eastern and Southern coasts. The book leads you to believe that the German's, had they attempted an invasion across the channel, would be destroyed on the beaches if not in the water. The truth is that if they managed to make sure, they would have annihilated the British defenses, so poor were the British prepared. They tried with what they had but that was sorrowfully far to little both in materials and professional expertise. The only true fight the Germans would have faced is in the air and on the water. The reading is OK but don't expect deep history.

This is a quite well written book about an event we tend to forget; perhaps because it never took place: The Nazi invasion of Britain.Although Hitler was plain out nuts, he could occasionally have a rational thought. Therefore, after the surrender of France in June, 1940, and the evacuation of the British Army from France that left most all of their equipment left behind at Dunkirk, it was actually quite logical to assume that Britain would soon seek an armistice. They didn't, and Hitler's armed forces found themselves planning an invasion of Britain in 1940.As this book makes clear, Hitler underestimated the logistical requirements of an invasion and overestimated the ability of the Luftwaffe to "soften" British resolve to continue the fight. Among his other overestimations were Hitler's own assumptions as to the degree to which his own military leaders were committed to such an invasion, not to mention Hitler's own desire to initiate an invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. However, as Mr. McKinstry well documents in this book, chief among Hitler's under-estimations was that of the military, the people, and the government of Britain in 1940.Once the British recognized that the French surrender was imminent, they reacted by saving as much of their own fighting force on the Continent as possible; but out of necessity, left most of their equipment behind. This was not simply a humanitarian decision, but a logistical one as well: Guns can be replaced pretty easily; a fully formed fighting force takes years. There was also the Royal Navy- far superior to what Germany could offer at that point, and able to defend the Channel should an invasion happen. The people and the government are somewhat of a piece. Mr. Churchill was not simply the leader of a government committed to continuing the battle, he was also the voice of a united country to defend, as the Man would often say- "The Realm".This is an excellent book.