Abyss: The Cuban Missile Crisis 1962

This is a great book. I'm giving it four-and-a-half stars: this is because IMO it is a brilliant treatment of the political and world-context aspects of the Cuban crisis, but a bit less stellar in the technical and temporal aspects of how the events of the 'Thirteen Days' unfolded.Abyss consciously looks at the 'Big Picture' -- not just, as so many books on the Crisis do, the events of the period 16-28 October 1962. The book opens with five preliminary and scene-setting sections: an Introduction that also relates the Cuba Crisis to today's events in Ukraine; a summary history of the 1961 Bay of Pigs debacle; and the first three chapters providing snapshots in turn of the society and politics in 1962 of Cuba, the Soviet Union and the USA. Not until page 135 of the hardcover edition are the first stages of the Cuba Crisis proper (Operation Anadyr, the planning and realisation of missile installations on Cuba) considered. And these opening five sections are brilliant. I hadn't previously known enough about the Cuban revolution of Castro and Che Guevara. That is now fixed. The USSR and USA scene-setting chapters are much more than a rehash of well-known material; the two chapters abound with new material, pen-pictures and insights. They help explain Soviet impulsiveness and recklessness in undertaking the Cuba venture at all, and the US hubris and arrogance that also contributed. Great stuff.Chapters 4 through 14 cover the Cuban Missile Crisis proper. I'm not going to summarise these. Enough to identify a few of the main themes of Sir Max Hastings.First, the Americans unthinkingly regarded it as their right and entitlement to decide what was to go on in Cuba, a sovereign nation just like (say) Britain or Turkey. There was no clear reason why Cuba should not have been allowed openly to invite the USSR to place missiles in Cuba, just like Britain and Turkey agreed to placement on their territories of US weapons. In fact, the Americans were imperialist and unwilling to allow Cuban self-determination. When the Americans discovered the missiles on Cuba, the shock to their sensibilities was extreme.Second, Khrushchev did a solo run on Cuba, which later (1964) cost him his job. His decision to install the missiles and all the Soviet support paraphernalia, including almost 50,000 servicemen, was reckless and impulsive -- and K did not think out the consequences at all.Third, American adoption of the blockade in lieu of direct military action, was then and in retrospect a masterstroke on the part of President Kennedy. Any assault would have almost certainly precipitated nuclear war started by use of tactical nukes (which the US was unaware of) in the hands of the Soviet military on Cuba. Disturbingly, unlike today (we fondly hope), there were no technical controls on independent use of any of these tactical weapons by ordinary Soviet officers on the ground. That no Russian at any point pushed a nuclear button must be seen as a miracle.Fourth, in 2022, we have worldwide data and video communications of almost unlimited capacity and immediacy. 1962 was the Stone Age in this regard. No meaningful real-time communication was possible with ships at sea. Communication, such as it was, was several hours in arrears. To send a message to Moscow, the Soviet embassy in the US had to handwrite, type, encrypt, dispatch by courier on a bicycle (!!) and wait. In effect, one-way transmission of a message between Washington and Moscow averaged 12 hours elapsed. The great deficiency in communication speed profoundly affected the course of the Crisis. (Don't feel smug: it's likely that the immediacy of today's comms would be open to abuse by malevolent parties, just in different ways).Fifth, Kennedy's greatness was confirmed by Cuba. Alone among the Americans, he could perceive the legitimacy of Cuba independently siting Soviet missiles on its territory by invitation. He resisted to the end the bellicosity of his military, who were spoiling for a (nuclear) fight. His discipline in outwardly maintaining a normal schedule during the Thirteen Days was superhuman. He was afraid of nuclear war. He sought compromise. He displayed grace and mordant humour under the greatest pressure.With the scene set by all the above, we see the Crisis unfold.In general, Sir Max Hastings is better at the political than the technical. In all the above -- and especially those opening 5 sections -- he plays to his strengths. Characters are brilliantly drawn and it is all so readable. Where he falls down a little is on the technical, temporal and forensic. For example, the famous about-turn of the Soviet ships as they approached the quarantine line north-east of Cuba could be described much more precisely, with on-shore and at-sea timings set against a detailed event-sequence. Doing this would clarify much that, even today, is disputed by those who just don't know the truth. I also spotted a few errors. Major Chuck Maultsby on October 27 did not overfly the Kola peninsula. He in fact got lost over Chukotka in Eastern Siberia, at least 7,000 miles to the east. A few pages later, the major becomes a captain. The Washington-Moscow hot line (see page 381) was not installed until 1963. In the Timeline at the front of the book, the events at Reykjavik of 11-12 October 1986 are wrongly transposed with the events of 8-10 December 1987 in Washington.In the great scheme of things, these are quibbles. Abyss is very good indeed. I would now keep two books of choice that, it seems to me, cover all aspects of the Cuba Crisis: Abyss for politics and context; and Dobbs' One Minute to Midnight for the technical and forensic.Recommended.

Per my review on 'Suez 1956' I knew little about Suez or 1962 Missile Crisis. Like many I'd heard of it, was aware JFK was in the Whitehouse, Krushchev in the Kremlin and had seen the monochrome images of Russian missiles heading to Cuba. Other than that I knew little of the build up to the crisis, the U2 flights over Cuba, the political intrigue etc.This book is excellent and filled in every detail I was missing.

Unreservedly, 5 stars. I'm old enough to remember the Cuban Missile Crisis. At the time, I lived about 30 miles, as the crow flies, from the US nuclear submarine depot in the Holy Loch. I remember going to bed at night wondering if I would waken next morning. A US friend told me his father, who lived very near New Year at the time, was similarly worried.The opening chapters start with a description of the Bay of Pigs fiasco and continue with the risen to power of Castro, describing the love - hate relationships many Cubans felt towards the USA and the quasi-colonial actions and behaviours of the US Government and many businesses towards Cuba and its citizens. This provide fertile ground for what was to follow.Hastings recounts well the rise to power of Khrushchev and his character, the early meeting between Khrushchev and Kennedy and how it set the scene for the Crisis itself. Aided by the recording system Kennedy had installed in the White House, we are given a first hand account of the manner in which Kennedy establish his ExComm team and the masterly way in which he balanced the views and recommendations of the very hawkish advisors, especially Curtis LeMay and others in the US military , against the pacifist recommendations of some diplomats and seasoned policy experts. Robert McNamara had a leading role which is all the more striking given his perceived later failure during the Vietnam War.Throughout, Kennedy is painted as balanced, even-handed and intelligent although he did make mistakes. These usually involved trying to rationalise Khrushchev's actions when, as Hasting describes it, he was all too often gambling. We can now, in the light of what's happening in Ukraine, whether Putin is indulging in brinkmanship or gambling? As much as Kennedy dominated the events in the White House, Khrushchev did likewise in the Kremlin according to the more limited sources available to Hastings. The other key individual in the centre of the crisis was Fidel Castro. Hastings is generous in describing his role in the Cuban revolution but also highlights his many failures as a national leader once independence had been gained. His most damning criticism comes in detailing Castro's blind aggression, to the point of trying to goad Khrushchev to use nuclear weapons in the midst of the crisis. We can only be thankful that, in spite of his recklessness, Khrushchev was wise enough not to turn over control of nuclear weapons to Castro. We should all fear that sometime in the future, a similar crisis will emerge between 2 regional powers, or indeed again between 2 superpowers, but with leaders who are more like Curtis LeMay or Fidel Castro in charge.Although the sequence of events is now in the public domain, Hastings manages to convey well the tension of the times as well as describing some close-run events which were not public knowledge for some time but could have triggered the escalation most people feared.In the final chapters, the aftermath and longer term consequences are nicely told.I have read more than a few of Sir Max Hastings's books and consider this to be one of his best. Some friends and family members might well be receiving a copy as a seasonal gift!Addendum. On reflecting further about the book, what also come to mind is the importance of West Berlin as it was then. I had forgotten how tense the security situation involving West Berlin. It was 14 months since the Berlin Wall was built, almost exactly 12 months since US and Soviet tanks directly confronted each other and, 8 months after the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy gave his famous "Ich bin ein Berliner" speech. Sir Max Hastings weaves the tensions and perceived threats involving West Berlin well into the fabric of the events of October 1962.

As usual, Mr Hastings provides an in depth study of world shaping events looking from all sides and view points.

Max Hastings is as ever the master of history and makes it so readable to become as good as a fiction thriller

I've been looking for a good book about the Cuban missile crisis for a while now especially after seeing the JFK episode of the untold history of the USA series.This book does not disappoint.It goes deep and its not a biased thesis written by some right wing reaganite type.Also the maps and photos are very good.It's definitely worth £5.50..I just wish some of hastings other books were on offer.I think I'll buy his Vietnam book next.

Eisenhower once said that our democratic processes must be safeguarded. A strange thing for a former 5 star general to advocate. This JFK fought the militancy of the top brass throughout which at times almost extended into outright mutiny. Constant battles with Le May and others time and time again almost plunged the world into the abyss. Good title but I find MH goes off track at times and wanders towards irrelevancies. It’s the story that’s fascinating here not the writing of it; compelling at times but MH’s style brings the narrative off the boil, hence 4 stars.