The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman, and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1941-1945

Michael Beschloss's study of the Allied management of the end of World War II with Nazi Germany serves as a reminder that things are not always as obvious as they seem. At first glance the goal of hostilities in Europe could easily be summed up as the defeat of Hitler and Nazi Germany's Axis allies. But how does one define "defeat?" Is it territorial annihilation, Sherman to the Sea on a more massive scale? Is it discredit or even elimination of the warring military leadership? Is it national humiliation? Or is it business as usual in the conquered territories under Allied overlords, as would be the case of Japan?This work is the story of how the United States, in concert with its allies, gestated its final plans for the conquest of Germany. One naturally gravitates toward Franklin D. Roosevelt as the leading man for such a drama, but in truth this book, like the events themselves, pivots around the persona of Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr. That Morgenthau was Jewish, one of few of his faith to achieve such status to that time, adds poignancy to the tale. Beschloss describes Morgenthau as perhaps Roosevelt's closest friend in the cabinet, a bond developed over their years together as neighboring self-styled gentlemen farmers in Dutchess County, NY. Despite Morgenthau's perceptions and desires, it was not exactly a friendship of equals. As was his wont, Roosevelt managed his communications with Morgenthau in the ethereal fashion of all his working associates. In truth Morgenthau enjoyed cabinet status because of difficulties Roosevelt had encountered earlier with the scrutinies of more independent men in the Treasury, Dean Acheson among them.His affection for Roosevelt notwithstanding, Morgenthau felt a particular responsibility to Jews under persecution in Nazi occupied territory. Early in the conflict Morgenthau had focused upon relocation of Jews from Germany and elsewhere, but as the War unfolded and the scope of atrocities became gradually evident to policy makers, Morgenthau pressured Roosevelt to make rescue of Jews a major priority during the engagement. Such considerations collided with concurrent Cabinet debate about the status and treatment of postwar Germany. This was not a matter of hawks and doves as much as a question of priorities. Instinctually, most policy makers wanted a hard peace for both military and punitive reasons. The question was how much of Germany's industrial infrastructure to destroy or spare in response to its crimes, a critical matter as 1944 hurried into 1945.By 1944 Winston Churchill had his fill of German militarism and would gladly have endorsed a Shermanesque solution to the German problem. Living through his second major encounter with the German military machine, he advocated utter annihilation of the nation's infrastructure, including its factories in the Ruhr Valley. Joseph Stalin, ever fearful of his west flank, would easily come around to Churchill's position as well, motivated not only by a will to survive but an opportunity to expand Communist hegemony.Morgenthau, despite his closeness to Roosevelt, was gradually losing place in the Cabinet. His peers believed that his Jewish faith and priorities blinded him to other military, political, and economic issues that worried them, and with reason. Beschloss makes splendid use of official minutes and private diaries to trace the strategic shifting going on around Roosevelt--insights into the concerns and motivations of Henry Stimson, Cordell Hull, and particularly John McCloy, who at the end of the day would probably do the most to derail Morgenthau's postwar vision.Roosevelt's 1944 Quebec meeting with Churchill, with Morgenthau in attendance, convinced the latter--wrongly, as it would turn out--that his boss and the Prime Minister were solidly behind his call for a hard and vengeful peace, the Morgenthau Plan. He returned home entirely justified, so much so that he felt emboldened to steer certain aspects of his peace plan toward the Washington Post, with added hints of opposition among certain cabinet members. The fallout from public disclosure ignited massive political difficulties in nearly every quarter. Joseph Goebbels jumped upon Morgenthau's plan as evidence that Allied strategic planning was aimed at reducing Germany to the stone ages. Morgenthau was blamed for stiffening German resistance and costing American lives. Thomas Dewey, then running for president in the 1944 campaign, jumped upon the strategy ["as useful as ten fresh German divisions"] and the now apparent disarray of the cabinet. Roosevelt distanced himself from the plan and from its author Morgenthau, a painful and humiliating blow for the latter. Mercifully, Morgenthau was unaware at the time that his own closest confidant, Henry Dexter White, was a Russian spy.The Battle of the Bulge, reported by American intelligence sources as a German response to the Morgenthau Plan, was probably the last straw that ended his influence upon conduct of the war. But other factors were weighing heavily upon the Allies. As western armies began crossing into Germany itself, the enormous damage already wrought upon the country's substructure made it clear that economic chaos and starvation were very likely at the conclusion of hostilities. All parties to the conflict, and notably England, were heavily in debt. The idea of a post-war German welfare state worried the international business community [except, ironically, America's own chief treasury officer.] To destroy the existing mines and factories of the Ruhr Valley, for example, seemed less and less desirable. In addition, growing concern in England and the United States about Russian post-war ambitions led to a grudging recognition that Germany could not be entirely demilitarized.On the other hand, Germany's heinous crimes of the half-century called for an appropriate response. Beschloss captures the dilemma of policy makers, torn between pragmatic and humanitarian concerns in the partition, punishment, and reorganization of Germany. The author presents his well researched account in a style marked by intimacy, immediacy and movement. He gives us another vantage point of the War. Assuming that we know something of how it was fought, Beschloss explains how it was ended--and how it could have ended.

I first encountered Michael Beschloss on PBS, and was taken with his insightful comments on presidential politics. Since then I've read a couple of his books, including "Presidential Courage." Since I'm a great fan of books about World War II and U.S. Presidents, why would I need to read another one that covers well-trod ground? Because there are endless interpretations of who did what, why, when, etc. Beschloss provides information and interpretation beyond what I've learned before - about FDR's and Truman's governing style, their handling of critical issues, dilemmas regarding war aims and military policy, relationships with other leaders and with their cabinet members, etc.The major focus is on the war against Germany rather than Japan - questions of military strategy, relations with Churchill and Stalin, and particularly views on how Germany should be treated after the war. It's well known that Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau favored turning Germany into a pastoral state; the degree to which he pursued this goal, and his ongoing attempt to pin FDR down as favoring this view, were covered in great detail. Morgenthau's relations with other cabinet members, and the chaotic attempts to gain support for his views, show an administration in disarray concerning critical policy questions as the war drew toward an end. Beschloss also reveals FDR both as a master manipulator of his subordinates and a person who could either change his mind or rely on incomplete information in making decisions about the fate of Germany.Another intriguing aspect of this book is the gossipy revelations about certain members of FDR's administration - e.g., Henry Stimson, Edward Stettinius, Cordell Hull - and how FDR kept them all on edge either by ignoring their advice, or playing one off against the other, or making conflicting commitments. All in all, a picture of a very human administration, given to infighting and personality conflicts, rather than a smooth-running machine with cast-in-concrete goals and actions.

FDR & Hitler were as different as two leaders could be. They did have one thing in common & that was their management style.Basically it was: Chaos. All those able men below them were never sure where they stood. Who had the bosses ear? Who did he talk to last? Is he mad at me today? They'd play one advisor against another & it worked. Nobody knew everything except FDR & Hitler & it mostly was in their head. But by November, 1944 FDR was dying & Hitler was a physical & mental wreck. Stalin,Churchill, Ike & later, Truman were up to the task. This book spent a lot of time on Henry Morgenthau, Treasury Secretary. He was FDR next door neighbor at Hyde Park & his best friend. He abused this special relationship, which allowed him to interfere in post-war plans for Germany. He had no special qualifications but he was a Jew. His plans for all Germans was harsh indeed. His proposal was a complete destruction of German industry. A pastoral Germany pre-Industrial Revolution, pre-unification & pre-Bismark. Germans were to subsist on what they could produce. Germany had not fed itself in the 20th century & this would have led to starvation. One of Morganthau's favorite lines was: "Three bowls of soup every day for every German." Now FDR hated the Germans & he humored Moganthau. But FDR's idea was to leave intact Germany's industrial capacity, which at the end of the war was still considerable, & turn it over to Great Britian for their use. At this point Great Britain was bankrupt. Churchill knew, with his keen foresight, that a strong Germany would be an important ally in the coming "Cold War" with the Soviets. Harry Truman was inexcusably kept in the dark on all post war planning. Then FDR died. But Harry was a quick study & rapidly grew into the presidency & was soon up to speed. As Morgenthau & all the old cronies of the previous 12 years discovered, Truman was no FDR.

Der 2. Weltkrieg wird bei uns oft rein aus deutscher Sicht behandelt, alles konzentriert sich auf Deutschland und die anderen reagieren eigentlich nur. das war natürlich rein gar nicht so. Dieses Buch gibt ein wenig Auskunft über die amerikanische Seite des Krieges, allerdings - und daher vergebe ich nur drei Sterne - konzentriert auf die Meinungsbildung am Ende des Krieges innerhalb des Kabinettes Roosevelt und seines Nachfolgers Truman sowie unter starker Betonung der Rolle des Finanzministers Morgenthau. Viel - und manchmal Erschreckendes - wird hier über die Zusammenkünfte, Meinungsaustausche und Tagebucheinträge der einzelnen Personen geschrieben. Zu kurz kommt eine Analyse der Gesamtzusammenhänge und auch die Behandlung der "harten" Fakten - was bedeutete der Krieg eigentlich für die amerikanische Gesellschaft insgesamt, für die Finanzen usw. Erschreckend finde ich v.a. die Informationen über Roosevelt und seine anscheinend nicht untypischen geistigen Aussetzer in den letzten Monaten vor seinem Tod, aber auch bereits davor.

All I can say is that my dad (retired doctor of 67 and history enthusiast) loved this book and started reading it at the Christmas table.