The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan

In "The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan", former NPR Moscow correspondent Gregory Feifer covers the 1979-1989 Soviet-Afghan war, primarily from the Soviet side, although with some input from the Afghan side. In short, it shows how the Soviets got involved in a war it probably had no business being in, and how they discovered it was much easier getting into Afghanistan than it was to get out.Feifer begins with a brief description and overview of Afghanistan, and how, over its long history, no country has ever conquered it. He then pieces together, as best he can, how the Soviet Union made the decision to invade Afghanistan (the principals did not leave any written record on how the decision was arrived at). Feifer then discusses the invasion and execution of the Afghan Prime Minister in detail. The ensuing fighting between the Soviets (and their Afghan allies) on the one side, and the various tribes and factions that made up the Mujahdeen on the other, take up most of the rest of the book. The author concludes with some analysis and aftermaths of the war.Feifer, while living in Moscow, was able to draw on Russian-language histories not available in English, and interview many participants of the war, both relatively important leaders as well as "grunts" on the ground (and in the air), and include their stories into the overall narrative. This is much more a "popular" style of history, instead of an "X's" and "O's" discussion of strategy and battles. The author also draws many analogies between the Soviet-Afghan war and the ongoing war led by the United States.There is a relative lack of studies on the Soviet war in Afghanistan in English, so this book is a welcome addition. I learned a great deal about the war from this book. For example, I was amazed at how poorly the average Soviet soldier was supplied and fed, and how that directly led to looting and murders of the local Afghans, which in turn hardened them against the Soviets. While this is not the definitive book about this war (nor, I believe, does it intend to be), it's good effort and well worth your time. Four stars.Kindle edition reviewed.

Gregory Feifer's book about the Soviet experience in Afghanistan is the best I have read to date. Its most interesting aspect is not the overall historical narrative, which any good journalist can recount, but the personal interviews, where actual combatants relate their own experiences on the front lines, and their frustrations at having to prosecute a war that was unnecessary, poorly planned, and even more poorly supported. Particularly striking are the accounts of the petty cruelties inflicted by Soviet soldiers on each other. Small wonder that most draft-age Soviets tried every trick they could to avoid serving in Afghanistan, or the Soviet Army as a whole, if possible. What passed for hazing in the American Army in the Vietnam era is small beer compared to the tortures that average Soviet recruits had to bear.One of my favorite parts of Feifer's book is the story related by Valeriy Vostrotin, of "Devyataya Rota" fame, of the Spetsnaz assault on the Tajbeg Palace in December, 1979. The object of the assault was to kill Afghanistan's murderous ruler Hafizullah Amin, who, like Rasputin, had proved impervious to poison while all around him dropped like flies. I also found Aleksandr Rutskoi's fanciful account of his 1988 shootdown to be enormously interesting, if not exactly believable. Rutskoi, who was later to become Russia's Vice President and Yeltsin's principal opponent in the struggle for power in October 1993, says, apparently with a straight face, that he was shot down over Pakistan by F-16's, taken prisoner, and then traded for an American CIA agent in the Soviet Embassy in Islamabad. He got the "shot down and taken prisoner" part right, but if his antique MiG-23 had actually been downed by Pakistani F-16's, he would have never have seen them coming and would not have survived the encounter. Also, his tale about being swapped for a CIA agent at the Soviet Embassy in Islamabad begs the question of how the CIA agent would have come to be held in the Soviet Embassy in the first place. Nevertheless, it makes for an amusing, if not entirely plausible, Cold War tale.I served in Afghanistan during the last six months of the Soviet occupation, and met a few of the people mentioned in Feifer's story. His account of them seems pretty accurate to me. I would not exactly call Feifer's book a definitive history of the war, but it is instructive for those who today would seek to solve the problems of the Afghans for them. The task looks easy at first, but things quickly turn bad and then you are stuck. We Americans might have better luck than the Soviets did, and will certainly do better than the poor British did in the First Afghan War (they were wiped out), but getting anywhere in Afghanistan will take more time than the decade the Soviets put in. Perhaps more importantly, it will cost us many casualties and billions in treasure. Things have a way of getting out of hand in that part of the world, as we are about to learn -- again.

This book had so much potential, but couldn't seem to decide what it wanted to be--an eyewitness account of Russian soldiers who fought in Afghanistan, a book of history, or a thinly-veiled attack on those in power who had no clue how to really manage this war.The author displays obvious knowledge of the details of the Soviet-Afghan conflict, going in-depth into the reasons behind it and discussing socio-political events on both sides. However, in the midst of a factual, over-arching discussion, we are suddenly immersed into the minutia of individual soldiers' lives and records of conversations, often following one person for three or four pages of detailed interaction, but no analysis. I think this technique is interesting, but there is little to no introduction of each short biography, and never any mention that each person's experience is not necessarily representative of the whole. Overall, interesting information, but poorly and seemingly randomly presented.In contrast with this, we have the last two chapters, which move so quickly and cover so much ground, I wonder why the author included them at all, especially considering he devoted more space to discussing one mother's search for her MIA son than he did to the Cheychnan conflict, or to the years of infighting amongst the mujahidin following Soviet withdrawal.Altogether, in a very short space, this book tries to do so much, and fails at doing much at all. Worth reading for the mostly new information on the Soviet side, but be prepared to skim.

Having read a lot on the subject of Vietnam, I have moved onto the Russian conflict in Afghanistan and it is compulsive reading. Covering the conflict from the political angle as well as the from the view point of the soldiers on the ground it paints a grim picture of life in a country that refuses to be oppressed or occupied. Detailed and well researched, it is easy to read and gives a balanced view of both sides of the conflict. Recommended.

This is a great book with some very interesting information. A must buy for understanding the war.

Catalogues the Soviet military (mis)adventure. Possibly 75,000 Red Army dead. Arguments against meddling in Afghanistan plain to see – not that the west learned them.

Great insight into the Soviet war in Afghanistan...the flawed decision to invade and the poorly resourced army resonate today with the US invasion.Afghanistan has been an enigma and without understanding will be destined to be a failed state for the foreseeable future.

good book

In many ways this book attempts the same as Artyom Borovik's The Hidden War: A Russian Journalist's Account of the Soviet War in Afghanistan - to portray the Soviet war in Afghanistan from a soldier's perspective. Like Borovik, the soldiers interviewed are primarily from the Russian and government Afghan side, unlike Borovik, the work has not been carried out during the hostilities but afterwards. Even the cover page is the same with one of the editions.Feifer writes a readable account, based primarily on personal interviews and follows the conflict from the April Revolution in 1978 till the end. The first quarter actually details the build-up to the conflict and I found that aspect of the book particularly valuable. A lot of the decision making and planning seems to be straight out of Dixon's how not to do it guide (On the Psychology of Military Incompetence (Pimlico)). I also appreciated some new aspects to the war, such as the logistics and communication being poor from the start and some preventable early mistakes (such as not giving the Russian soldiers money, which encouraged looting and trading guns and ammo for supplies, insufficient / inadequate food and housing facilities, etc.) - many of which have sadly been replicated by the current NATO forces to some extent.The fog of war comes across relatively well, too and it seems that the American penchant for blue on blue was very much evident with the Soviets as well (red on red I guess) - too many lives have been lost due to poor communication and subsequent friendly fire.Some minor niggles - while the book follows a chronological sequence, often aspects are described a bit ahead of the timeline of the major work, so there is a bit of to-ing and fro-ing throughout - I suppose as a result of following individual personalities / interviewees.And finally, I found Borovik's book the more convincing one. It may only portray the latter stages of the conflict (1987 / 1989) but Borovik was on the ground and produced a first hand account, as well as including interviews of others at the time of the actual events. It might have a bit less of the historical hindsight element than here but is perhaps a purer telling of the story because of it. The Hidden War: A Russian Journalist's Account of the Soviet War in AfghanistanOn the Psychology of Military Incompetence (Pimlico)

This is a very well researched, and very well written study of an important conflict. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the Cold War was still well and truly in progress. Therefore details of the conflict, the build up to it, and the aftermath were very sketchy due to the secretive Soviet regime at the time.The author has relied on interviews with Soviet personnel who actually served in the conflict to build up a very readable and very absorbing account. One thing that seems to come through repeatedly during the book is that the NATO nations who currently have forces in Afghanistan have learnt absolutely nothing from the experience of the Soviets, and seem to be making the same mistakes over and over again. As the saying goes "A fool learns from his own mistakes ~ A wise man learns from the mistakes of others." Someone should tell that to the leaders in the West.An excellent book.

Discreto libro, parla dei processi decisionali assurdi che portarono alla decisione sovietica di invadere l'Afghanistan, con conseguente guerra e tragedie.La parte migliore del libro è proprio quella che tratta i prodromi e le fasi iniziali del conflitto, in cui si comprende come la mentalità della gerontocrazia sovietica non potesse che portare ad un risultato tragico per tutti.

This is a great book about the Soviet War in Afghanistan... if you need information about the last years of the Red Army, you must read it.

The book is a long tale of individual stories but fails to give an overall picture of what really happened.

interessantissimo con tantissime cose mai sapute sulla stampa italiana che tragedia ! facile lettura chissà se lo hanno letto quelli che ci hanno mandato i nostri soldati

Bezieht sich auf das AUDIOBOOK; das Audiobook steht und fällt mit der Stimme. Der Leser verschluckt in seinem Deep Throat English oft ganze Satzendungen. Singsang ist garnicht vorhanden, sodass es schwer fällt sich in die Stimmung der Soldaten zu versetzen.Rein Inhaltlich muss man sagen, hat der Autor im Großen und Ganzen eigentlich nur die Erlebnisberichte einiger Soldaten wiedergegeben, was aber einen tiefen Einblick vermittelt ( daher 2 Sterne und nicht 1), aber wenn man einen Abriß über den Afghanistan-Einsatz sucht, ist man hier an der falschen Stelle. Chronologisch und Analytisch bietet das Buch garnichts; wir hören nichts über die Strategie der Soviets, was sich im Politbüro alles abgespielt hat ( während des Krieges), wie die russische Öffentlichkeit das Problem wahrgenommen hat; Der Autor verliert sich in Details der afghanischen Provinzmentalität, aus der das Buch nicht herauszukommen scheint. Man muss ja bis CD 5-6 warten, bis das Buch aus dem Geplänkel wie denn der Regierungspalast gestürmt wurde, herauskommt. Zu schwach für eine Thematik, die gerade uns Deutsche moment sehr interessiert.