First-Class Passengers on a Sinking Ship: Elite Politics and the Decline of Great Powers

Richard Lachmann (1956-2021) was a comparative political sociologist who developed elite conflict theory. Here he uses that theory to great effect to explain why Spain and France failed to become hegemonic powers, why the Dutch hegemony was brief, why the British hegemony was longer, and why the American hegemony is weakening.His definitions are critical. "An elite is a group of rulers who inhabit a distinctive organizational apparatus with the capacity to appropriate resources from non-elites." So Lachmann's elites are similar to Marx's ruling classes in exploiting some producing classes. But what makes the elite different is its conflict with rival elites, so relations among elites matter as much as interclass relations of production. "Elite conflict is the primary threat to elite capacities," and "elite capacities change primarily when the overall structure of elite relations changes" (26-27).How are hegemons different from empires and dominant or great powers? "...[A] polity can be said to be hegemonic only as long as it is able to enforce a system of geopolitical and economic relations that advantages it over all other polities" (49).In Chapter Two, Lachmann analyzes several theories of great power decline, including those of Michael Mann, Jack Goldstone, and the world-system theories of Immanuel Wallerstein and Giovanni Arrighi. Of greater interest outside academia, he also analyzes the theories of Niall Ferguson, Jared Diamond, and Paul Kennedy. Using the data from his case studies, he demonstrates that they all fail to a greater or lesser extent, to explain the actual trajectories.Most readers will probably be most interested in the later section of the book on American hegemony and its decline, but this section makes more sense based on the comparison to previous hegemons and failed hegemons. Spain and France failed, according to Lachmann, because of their inability to overcome internal elite conflicts. The Netherlands achieved elite unity and hegemony only briefly, while Britain was able to forge a more durable elite alliance and a much longer period of hegemony. Lachmann concludes that there are four factors which can prevent hegemony, all having to do with elite conflicts.Lachmann's anatomy of the U.S. is presented in Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight, which cover the breakdown of post-WWII elite consensus and the currrent conflict and paralysis; the U.S. military, which is weakened by the elite conflicts of inter-service rivalry and military corporations committed to huge contracts for weapons that are not suited to current conflicts; and the financial cannibalization of the domestic economy.But "...[r]epeated American financial malfeasance, even fraud that has cost banks and governments elsewhere in the world trillions of dollars in degraded assets and lost economic growth, has yet to undermine US economic hegemony. The Fed remains the central and commanding regulator of global finance, and the dollar remains the world currrency. US Treasury bonds continue to be viewed as among the world's safest investments, and the only one capable of absorbing the vast surpluses of other nations" (413).Lachmann concludes that US financial hegemony benefits all US elites, and so prevents the elite conflicts that ended previous hegemonies -- for now. Ultimately the same financial hegemony corrodes other pillars of American power and prevents the emergence of a government that might act in the interest of non-elite Americans.The day is not yet in sight when any other power, including the EU or China, could create an alternative to US hegemony via its financial regulation. So while Lachmann's analysis, on the one hand, is one of American decline, on the other hand it is one of continued US hegemony for the foreseeable future.

In the past couple of years I've read about 20 books on current affairs, current politics, world problems, what-have-you. This book puts it all together like no other. Lachmann gives detailed historical background of past empires and hegemonies, and then follows the money (and the military, and social attitudes) from the beginning of the US, through its rise to hegemony, and into the present. His knowledge of history, finance, and military control is wonderful, and his synthesis is tight and convincing.One work of warning, this is not an easy read. It is quite academic and assumes the reader has a lot of knowledge. But working through it is definitely rewarding.

This is an academic book which is not for the faint hearted.It is definitive but would mainly suit an advanced (PhD or Masters) student researching this topic of the decline and fall of empires.Masses of citationsDefinitely NOT for the casual reader.