Hell In A Very Small Place: The Siege Of Dien Bien Phu

I spent a fair span of my life as a professional soldier (I did not serve in Vietnam, but I am of that era), and I'm now an academic, and my judgement from both ends of my life commends this volume. There have been more recent works, perhaps corrective of this one, on the battle of Dien Bien Phu, and some of them are, for the beginner, more accessible than this one. But no one interested in this famous, horribly wasteful encounter should pass this book by.I'll start by commenting on the virtues and difficulties of this book, and then I'll make some remarks about the battle.The first and most obvious strength of this text is its immediacy. Fall was able to interview many of the surviving participants of the battle, to include those in the Viet Minh, and was well acquainted with the larger issues and personalities of French Indochina due to his work as a reporter there (see his important work, "Street Without Joy."). It's clear he had access to unit and communications logs surrounding this battle. To have such access, as well as the opportunity to speak with those involved and engaged, gets us as close to what happened as one is likely to discern; hence, this book, whatever its errors, will be considered foundational to the understanding of this battle for quite some time. Of course let's allow that figures like Cogny, de Castries, and others each had their own ax to grind after the battle (and each did), but Fall's account is clearly cognizant of these conflicts and he seems to account for them.The treatment of the battle is quite meticulous -- unit designations and positions, at least for the French, are identified sometimes to the company level (Viet Minh designations rarely fall below regimental level), and a generous provision of diagrams help us follow the progress of the battle from the initial jump to the denouement. Ample appendices supply the order of battle. I recognize that for some readers the constant references to particular units and so on is hard to digest, but the fact is, this is the real spadework of military history.Fall's account of Dien Bien Phu also includes the geopolitical implications -- something on which I would wish he had done a touch more in this book. He discusses how the impetus of the planned Geneva talks drove events in the battle, and how British and American internal politics prevented them from assisting the French in any kind of meaningful way. It remains an open question whether American air power -- whether B-29s saturating the area around the fortress or carrier-borne aircraft flying close air support -- may have turned the tide, at least until the Geneva talks began. At any rate, Fall makes it clear that the experience in Korea and the fear of Chinese intervention rendered France's purported allies impotent. Russian and Chinese supply of ammunition and weapons may have been decisive in this battle, as the text makes clear (especially at the end, when the Viet Minh were using Soviet Katyusha rocket launchers).And of course a major geopolitical aspect of this engagement, as Fall reminds us regularly, was the multinational dimension of the deployed French force -- French, Vietnamese, Algerian, Moroccan, and Legionaries from across Europe -- that complicated the action and proved the first shovel-turns of the graveyard of French colonialism around the globe.As for issues with the book: for those not accustomed to reading detailed tactical history, I can see how this book might be tough go, and how an easier text might be a better read. This was not an issue for me. More pointedly, I was bothered that the many diagrams lacked topographic detail. To understand the military aspects of the terrain better I found myself seeking out topographic maps elsewhere, and only looking at them helped me to understand what a horrid fix the French had put themselves in by picking this as a position they hoped to serve their strategic interest. I'm sure some readers would be helped by some knowledge of the range and burst-radius (or comparable power) of many of the weapons employed.A further issue is this: the book emphasizes French heroism at the battle -- and I must acknowledge that many courageous deeds were done, beyond what I imagine I could ever do. But as the late John Keegan notes in more than one place, we have a bad habit of giving names and faces to "our" side but none to the others. The Viet Minh, in this text, largely remain nameless and faceless. Fall can name members of French tank crews, but cannot name a single Viet Minh sapper. That leaves us with a somewhat slanted account -- but still one I would not be without.Fall's account of the battle should remind us, first and foremost, of the importance of logistics. The French failure at Dien Bien Phu can almost entirely be accounted to their inserting a force where it could not be viably supported once invested. Air landing of supplies and aerovac of the wounded became impossible once the airstrip came within the range of Viet Minh direct-support artillery, and air drops of supplies, always a crap-shoot, became a bad bet once effective anti-aircraft artillery was in place. On the contrary, the Viet Minh, as Fall points out, established a fairly effective line of resupply for their artillery and troops, using impressed coolie labor that avoided French airstrikes.One thing Fall's account does not neglect is the obvious callousness of the Viet Minh to their own losses. Not unlike the North Koreans and Chinese in the decade's earlier conflict, the Viet Minh seemed to have no problem with sending thousands into the meat-grinder of quad-50s and 120-mm mortar final protective fires. No wonder they never thereafter built a worker's paradise (according to my Vietnamese students and friends).I was a paratrooper myself -- time served in the 101st and USASOC. So in the end I find myself, for better or worse, justly or unjustly, sympathizing with Fall's admiring portrait of the French paras who jumped into this hell-hole. The courage, resourcefulness, determination, and sheer guts they showed under horrid circumstances is worth everyone's pause, if not praise. And you don't have to believe in their orders or national policy to acknowledge their dignity.

I knew virtually nothing about Dien Bien Phu other than the standard types of things that it was the pivotal battle of the First Indochina War, effectively ended French colonialsim in SE Asia, etc. and decided to buy this book to learn more. In short, if you have any interest in military history, French or US history, or are just looking for a good read, don't hesitate to buy this book. There is an ENORMOUS amount of detail about the battle in this book, but it is wonderfully written with a deft prose. This is not some dry scholarly work that will require discipline to finish. You will feel the agony of the French soldiers as they continue to hold on while the Viet Minh are slowly squeezing them. I literally could not put this book down.The book starts with a description of the initial parachute drop into Dien Bien Phu, then backtracks a bit to set the stage and introduce the players. Fall then describes the build-up by the Viet Minh through a horrendous jungle supply line, and the preparation of the position by the French. The bulk of the book describes in great detail the siege. Outlying positions are reduced and pressure is slowly but steadly put on the central position until it is finally overrun. There is an incredible amount of detail here, the battles are often described (from the French side at least) at the platoon level. Perhaps the most interesting chapter is the discuss of Great Game politics between the US, France, and Britian as DBP is slowly being strangled. One thing that I never realized is that there was an intimate link between the French war in Indochina and the US/UN police action in Korea.There are several specific points made in this book that may be of general interest. First, Fall does not specifically blame one individual or decision for the catastrophe at Dien Bien Phu, but he does point out errors. He also dispells several myths that have grown up around the battle. For example, the French made several key errors in judgement by overestimating the effect of their own artillery, underestimating the effect of the Viet Minh artillery, not having a clear goal as to why a battle was being fought at Dien Bien Phu in the first place, among a host of other. One of the most interesting things stated by Fall though is that Dien Bien Phu was a failure of combat engineering. French intelligence knew that the Viet Minh were transporting 105 mm howitzers to the battle area. The fortifications required to defend a fixed position against such artillery were well known from WWII. The airlift capability of the French Air Force was in no possible way capable of delivering the required materials to protect 10,000 men. Fall discounts the idea that French intel failed (they predicted the size of the Viet Minh army at Dien Bien Phu to 10%). Fall also states that only a relatively small fraction of the Legionnaires at DBP were Germans. From other research, this claim seems still to be controversial, but there is a myth that many of the defenders of Dien Bien Phu were former German/SS soldiers.I strongly disagree with one of the reviewer Paul Conners on several counts. First, this is not the `definitive' work on the battle. Fall wrote this book in the mid-60s and had no access to Viet Minh records. He did have some access to soldiers who fought on the Viet Minh side, but the complete story can only be told once full access to Viet Minh records is given to (Western) professional historians. This is, however, one of the best works of military history ever written in my view, even if it is not complete. Second, this is not an all encompassing account of the First Indochina War. Fall does put the battle into perspective of the larger war at some level, but this is certainly not his emphasis. Having read this book, I'm left with the feeling that I need to put it into a larger perspective. Don't let these small criticisms of the book (or of Mr. Conner's otherwise excellent review) prevent you from buying the book. I simply wanted to clarify a few points.Finally, several of the reviewers used their reviews to take shots at the French soldiers and officier (cowards, incompetent, etc.). I think after reading this book you will have a new appreciation for the French soldiers. Yes, mistakes were made by the French leadership in many aspects of the battle, but to call them cowardly or incompetent shows that these reviewers have no idea what they are talking about. Are General Navarre and his staff any less incompetent than General Westmoreland a decade later, or the current US (political and military) leadership in Iraq? Read the book, I think you'll develop an appreciation for the martial qualities of the French Army.I would give this book six stars if I could. One of the best, most detailed, yet readible books in military history ever written.

The story of the fall of Dien Bien Phu is expertly told by Bernard Fall. But the journey is a difficult one and you should know what you are getting into before you start it. Before deciding to read this there are four things you should consider.Firstly Fall wrote this in 1966 at a time when the USA is increasing its commitment to Vietnam, and he is desperate that his country understand the consequences of this action. Consequently, Fall does not let an opportunity go by to point out the desperation of foreign troops fighting an unwinnable war in a foreign land. His work is littered with final paragraph sentences along the lines of "the situation was bad ... but it was about to get worse". Indeed the whole book follows this structure. It is profoundly depressing.The style is also 1960s. Yes this is a story, but it is told through detail and facts, and lots of both. It is interesting to compare this story with the style of "Stalingrad". Bernard Fall does not impose his interpretation of the conflict on the reader, simply describing what happened, where, when. Fall understands that the story is more important than the teller whereas in reading Starlingad, I got the impression that I was seeing the conflict through the lens of the author's ego.As a Brit I was bought up without much respect for French fighting prowess. It was something of an awakening to find that the heroism of these Frenchmen is simply huge. Fall describes acts of courage that exceeds anything i have seen Hollywood produce, and let's face it, this is saying something. But it is almost as if Fall lived through the hell of Dien Bien Phu himself and as a result he obsessively details many acts of heroism and each of the people carrying them out. By the end of the story I found myself ... attached to the story's heroes but recognise that you might simply find it boring.Finally, this is a French story of French fighting courage, tactical brilliance and strategic stupidity. Apart from one tragic scene with a Frenchman walking captured through a field of barbed wire and smatterings of heroic Vietnamese actions recognised through medals there is little description of the more brutal experiences of the Viet Minh and only infrequent description of how the French foot soldier saw the conflict. If you want more of an insight into their stories, you will have to find it elsewhere.If you have the stomach for a brutal description of war in a foreign field, this is the book for you. In honesty, I found it tough reading and on several occasions had to take a break, most noticeably when a mixed force charges the hill E1 and breaks into multi cultural song. But this book grabs you and if you get through 100 pages you will finish it.

Simply one of the best military history books I have ever read; the story of a French example of lions being led by donkeys.Fall takes us into the context of the battle, explaining the flawed reasoning behind creating the Base Aero Terrestriel in the first place, then describing each stage of the unfolding tragedy of Operation Castor, from initial optimism to doubt to heroic defiance and final acceptance of defeat.The book shows the human spirit at its best on both sides; the Viet Minh's incredible logistical triumph in transporting the seige force to the valley and their courage to continue in the face of appalling losses, and the French/Colonial army's courage and tenacity in fighting a hopeless cause against huge odds for so long.The abbreviations of the French military units can be a little impenetrable for a while, but the effort is richly rewarded as you become able to follow the fortunes and heroics of the dwindling force of defenders.It left me profoundly moved and with a strong desire to visit the battlefield myself, if only to see strongpoint Eliane 2, which was the site of such incredible bravery and sacrifice on both sides.A difficult proposition for British and American readers at times, as both nations are shown ultimately to have decided their geopolitical interests were best served by not intervening to save the beleaguered garrison. There must be an interesting alternative history story in waiting for someone to write, showing what might have happened if they had.

An excellent account of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, which started off the decline of French colonial rule over Indochina. Fluent journalistic prose with more stress on personal experience rather than abstract political or technical aspects.

This is an account of war in Vietnam that the American military and politians should have read, in the same way that the British and American leaders should have read "Afghansty" before we made the mistake of getting involved in there as well.

This book could have saved a lot of american lives, a well thought out account Dien Bien Phu, and it's French defense being taken apart by Vietnamese peasants.