Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958

During 2005-6, it was becomming readily apparent that military situation in Iraq was going from bad to worse. In an effort to get the war effort back on track, many people from generals on down to Think Tanks that support the military began to re-examine many of our basic war fighting assumptions. The Rand Corporation went back into its vaults and re-published David Galula's classic 1963 study of counter-insurgency in Algeria.From 1956 to 1958, David Galula was a captain in the French Army and stationed in the rugged mountains of coastal Algeria. His mission was to counter an insurgency of Algerian peasants who were fighting a war for national liberation. When he arrived in the Kabylia region of Algeria, the insurrection was beginning to pick up momentum. His duty was to pacify one small section of this mountainous region. He brought to this task a wealth of experience that he picked as the French military attache in Hong Kong in the early 1950's. From this posting, Galula had the unique opportunity to experience and learn from insurgencies in China, Indochina and Malaysia.Unlike many of his contemporaries in the Paratroops and Foreign Legion (i.e. Roger Trinquier), Captain Galula was not an advocate of "modern" warfare with its emphasis on hard hitting combat and over-reliance on torture. His approach took on many of the aspects of social science. From the very beginning, Galula understood that in a "people's war" it was critical to segregate the civilian population from the insurgents. His approach emphasized policing over combat and providing services to the civilian population.What makes "Pacification in Algeria" such a compelling read is that it concentrates on the experiences of one company commander in a small geographic area for a period of two years. By looking at a discrete area, one can understand that an insurgency is a much more complicated struggle than is usually understood from a distance. Insurgents can be motivated by such grand motivators as "nationalism" or a "clash of civilizations" but often as not, insurgencies are driven by more mundane things such as land and water rights,family fueds and inter-comunal rivalries. These complexities frustrate those who wish to see the world through a more manichean lense. For readers interested in more nuanced studies of insurgencies, I would recommend Lewis Taylor's "Shining Path; War in the Northern Andes" and David Stoll's "Between Two Armies in the Ixil Towns of Guatamala".

In "Pacification in Algeria", David Galula describes his (largely) successful experiences as a company commander and battalion S3/XO in Algeria in the late 1950's and draws on these experiences and his earlier exposure to Communist insurgency throughout Asia and the Balkans in order to develop and articulate a theory of COIN. Most of the book is a relatively detached and analytical (albeit honest) discussion of his experience and reaction to events as a company commander in a rather nondescript battalion and AO. The reader expecting exciting accounts of desperate battles or tales of derring-do will be disappointed - not only is combat fleeting, but Galula's perspective is about recounting what he thought and did in a "campaign planning" sense, rather than in the "here and now" tactical space. For anybody with more than a superficial interest in sub-unit operations there is however ample description, explanation and analysis of a range of tactical activities and objectives, be they kinetic or otherwise. Despite the author's obvious scholarly interest in advocating a theoretical approach to COIN, it is still relevant and enjoyable reading for tactical level commanders with more pressing concerns than wading through dense academic tracts.Both Galula's own actions and embryonic theory (explored more fully in  Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era)  are persuasively argued here - certainly, on first reading "Pacification in Algeria" at a point during a deployment to Afghanistan when I was wondering just how relevant our tactical successes really were, Galula's arguments that successfully shooting insurgents was irrelevant unless accompanied by measures to secure and win the support of the population were nothing short of a revelation. Galula's specific prescriptions should be treated as a guide to further thinking rather than a template, however - the reader should note that his theory was largely shaped by unique and absorbing experiences within his company/battalion AO which were characterised by a relative unity of command on the counterinsurgent side (no indigenous government or security "partners" being mentored here) - even if higher headquarters focused on traditional institutional perspectives and the wrong metrics for too long (sound familiar?) - and a relatively unsophisticated and politically malleable population within the AO.Overall, essential reading for anybody in or around platoon, company or battalion command groups that expect to engage in COIN operations, and highly recommended as a pivotal part of the "COIN canon" of modern western military thought.

I'm not sure what the reader comes to Pacification in Algeria expecting. Galula spent his formative years as a junior officer in the Far East looking at the British and American models as an alternate to the French adventure in Indochina (purely my opinion). As a result he cannot be considered representative of the French approach to counterinsurgency. Furthermore he was too junior an officer in an out of the way area in Algeria for his work to be considered an authoritative framework for success. In that regard he is a man out of place and time; not truly indicative of the French approach and not a big enough fish to make a difference with his alternate model. All the same Pacification in Algeria is well worth a read for those professional officers who want to look at one of the source documents for 3-24.If you are looking for historically useful works on the French approach then stick with Trinquier and Melnik.

This book is an absolute required read for anyone who wants to understand the complex nature of fighting counter-insurgencies. Galula who served in Algeria as a deputy commander and as a company commander was responsible for the successsful pacification of several areas under his command. Through ideas he gained from experience serving in China he was able to institute a series of lethal and less than lethal measures to defeat the insurgents in his area of operation. He lists his measures and those who are energized can create a check list of sorts to assist them if they are "going down range." Excellent book...

I bought this as part of the reading for an essay on counter-terrorism in Algeria , so it was very on-topic. The author was a solider serving the side of France in the conflict, and thus describes his own position with regards to combating terrorism and dealing with an insurrection.There is, therefore, a modern ring to it- clear parallels with Iraw might be drawn but the keen reader.I must admit I found this to be a little "dry" at time, altough it was certainly worth reading in places.Excuse a somewhat basic review, I read this book months ago, and memory fades a bit!