Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (Cambridge Military Histories)

Being thrilled with the WWII history, I found many things to ponder in this fine book. Most of them were sad things, unfortunately, because the same ready servility of the military high brass (toward their political leaders, I mean) was typical not for Germany only, but, in fact, for all her adversaries too. While reading the excellent Leonard Leshuk's research "US Intelligence Perceptions of Soviet Power 1921-1946" I was left simply breathless by absolutely false reports of the Western military specialists here, who were clearly inspired not by their knowledge of the Red Army's real state, but by the knowledge of their President's pro-Soviet sympathies. The same is true about Stalin's generals, who also preferred the Great Leader's opinion to their own professional one. Of course, there were few exceptions in Germany, USSR and USA, but the general rule of servility was rather common for all. Funny, but I had the impression from this book that the only persons with whom the German generals were sincere in their appraisals of the situation, were their wives. It would be most interesting to know what these ladies were answering to their starry hubbies! In this sense the Soviet brass' family correspondence is but absolutely useless, alas: historians can't get anything from it except the authors' holy fear before omnipresent censorship.The main concept of the book (the blitzkrieg's total failure by the August 41) is fully supported by thorough researches and our veterans' memoirs, published here in Russia after the USSR collapse, with a generous use of the trophy archives – it's a great pity that language barrier didn't permit the author to get acquainted with the other side's treasury also. I was disappointed a bit by his low opinion of Victor Suvorov's magnificent research on Stalin's own "Barbarossa": the "Groza" operation, which had to hit Germany in July 41, enslaving all the Europe to the Kremlin dictator. If only Hitler would wait with his plans just two weeks more… But my knowledge of the "Groza" threat made this book's reading even more thrilling. Since his first "Icebreaker", mentioned by Mr. Stahel in an undeservedly condescending manner, Suvorov wrote several more valuable additions to his initial masterpiece ("Suicide", "Day M", "Last Republic" etc). They were never translated in the West, thanks to the traditional static (stale?) views of the left academia, but then quite a few professional historians both here and in Germany did find a lot of confirmative material to the revelation of Suvorov. I can't understand why Mr. Stahel finds any respect for the cheap arguments of anti-Suvorov concoction by the Israeli pseudo-historian leftist Gorodetski (he was warmly welcomed by our, still deeply Stalin-charmed, high brass, naturally, – and this says more than all his trashy polemics!).During the events, described by Mr. Stahel, I was just a small child in my Leningrad (where my two elder sisters died of hunger in the Nazi siege), but it doesn't prevent me to be thirsty now for each new drop of truth about those dreadful times – my sincere gratitude to the worthy author for satisfying this thirst in his most generous way! Rostislav, Saint-Petersburg, Russia.

This book, which is the first in a new series of academic studies on warfare and is edited by the highly acclaimed author and professor, Hew Strachan, is destined to become an instant classic. I must admit to the reader here at the beginning, that initially I purchased David Stahel's work simply because he referenced one of my studies in his bibliography (call it pride of authorship). However, once I actually read the work, I realized that it is a very well researched piece of scholarship. Having been published by Cambridge University Press, one does not expect anything less than stellar studies. This one is a gem.With great detail, Stahel weaves the fabric pattern of history that was Germany's 1941 summer campaign. Many times describing the seemingly insignificant details of the campaign, which make sense when one takes a step back and sees the entire tapestry of this titanic and cataclysmic event called the Russo-German War. The book is sure to appeal to both the most fastidious academic historian as well as the casual reader. Therein lies the secret to Stahel's successful study - that this book has been written in such a manner that it will appeal to a wider audience than academic studies usually do.His thesis - that Germany lost the war in 1941 during the summer campaign in central Russia, especially in August 1941 during the battle for Smolensk. No other author of late has made such a bold statement. To date I can only think of Stolfi's "Hitler's Panzers East" - although his thesis (to me anyway) appeared to be flawed. Given the magnitude of Stahel's work, it's not surprising that he keeps his description strictly on the events which occurred in the region of Heeresgruppe Mitte.Stahel does not merely rehash old material like a dime store WWII author. An example would be the following: everyone knows that Hitler reduced the TO&E strength of each panzer division immediately after the fall of France, from an average of 300 armored vehicles to 150 in order to double the size of his panzer divisions. However, no one up till now has actually described the losses which each panzer division incurred and the terribly deficient low percentage of strengths that Hitler's armored strike force possessed before, during, and after the Battle for Smolensk.Another reviewer states that the pros and cons of the Red Army were not included in the author's calculations, but Stahel actually does go into some detail about armor. His study of the performance of the new tanks being received in the summer of 1941, in addition to detailed descriptions of how many Red Army units resisted bitterly, costing the Germans time and troops - the two "T's" which they did not have in sufficient abundance for such a campaign, is explosive and ground-breaking.The study of the Red Army which, up until now, would have received a perfunctory "D" or "F" performance for its summer 1941 campaigning season, is turned on its head. On the contrary, with irrefutable evidence, Stahel describes how the Red Army fought far better than has been depicted. An example is the amount of detail and attention that he pays to the newly arriving armored vehicles of the Red Army. Although few in number and having teething problems like lack of sufficient crew training or organization, he describes the huge impact that the medium T-34c and heavy KV-1 tanks had on the Wehrmacht.I could go on "ad infinitum," but I digress....This study is a great addition to anyone's WWII library and especially their Eastern Front library. Panzer enthusiasts may not like the fact that Germany's doom in the east may have been sealed just two months and a week into the campaign, but there will certainly be enough material for argument and discourse from this ground-breaking study for years to come. Buy it!