Fire on the Water: China, America, and the Future of the Pacific

This is an exceptionally well written thesis by a highly knowledgeable author with solid references and background, presented in a cogent and compelling manor. I just don't buy it.Author Robert Haddock believes passionately that the US has vital Asian interest imminently threatened by a rising China buttressed by friendly relations with its neighbor Russia and seeks to dominate the region by denying US military access. His answer is "Spend more. A lot more.". What is less clear is why? How would that benefit Americans?Haddock acknowledges both that it has been US investment, and US abandonment of its manufacturing capacity to lower-wage China in exchange for higher investor profits that has created the monster that those who lost their jobs to will now be asked to pay higher taxes and send their children to fight. He goes on about their "salami chopping" encroachment strategy of achieving their goals - which is both true and troubling. But if you have already confirmed that if its American jobs and trade that underwrites Chinese aggression, then why not removed the fuel from their fire and limit trade? Why continue to pay for our adversary's military?[Globalization has transferred out jobs and middle class to China and east Asia so that US corporations who outsource manufacturing there can sell those same products right back to Americans at the same price but with substantially lower quality. A demographic that used to work in our factories - however inefficient, still were able to buy a home, raise a family, buy healthcare, and raise a family. Now they work at service jobs and require public assistance with healthcare. Globalization has been a race to the bottom for most Americans. Haddock makes the point that US agriculture is exported to Asia, but that has no where near the economic impact of refrigerators, cars, and appliances. The point is that middle-class America has more reason to cheer for Asian disruption and blocked trade than to defend it.]Haddock makes excellent arguments about how our Navy is ill-prepared to dominate the region because the IMF missile treaty limits the range of our missiles to just outside of China's defense zone, and that sailing warships inside of it will create sitting ducks. He maps out the changes required to gain offensive dominance in that challenging arena. But he doesn't convince me that its in our interest to do so.Haddock points to how US prowess in attacking Iraq in 1991 - the massive display of military might, logistics, and technology, intimidated Chinese military planners. He talks about how we out-spent Russia in the late 1980's causing the breakup of their union. But he doesn't talk much about our complete inability to succeed in Afghanistan after 15 years against a rag-tag group of militants in a country that doesn't even manufacture rifles or gunpowder. He doesn't mention the abject disaster in Syria and Iraq. He doesn't mention our inability to prevail on Korea or Vietnam. He doesn't mention that while we have great military technology and spend far more than any country in history, that we don't know what the hell we are doing with that power or how to use it. He does, however, mention that countries whom we defend and spend enormous amounts of money on such as South Korea and Japan and Philippines, really, really don't want us there, and that in the event of a hot conflict with China, that our regional 'allies' are likely to remain neutral in the event of a Chinese victory. So, what are we fighting for?Since WWII we have sacrificed roads, bridges, healthcare, and education to build a military that can prevail against any other in the world and it has been a disaster - both for Americans and the world. Its time to mind our own business and defend our own shores and rebuild our own country starting with taking trade and manufacturing back from countries who are emerging as regional hegemons.Haddock points to rising economy in Germany prior to WWI and their desire to militarily protect shipping routes that threatened British naval supremacy as a factor leading to that war. But England had already declined from its glorious Mercantile Triangle manufacturing era that fueled the empire, and now set its sights on controlling the middle east oil lands where the German-Ottoman alliance stood in the way. Dragging the US into that war simply set the stage for the rise of Hitler, WWII, and the demise of Britain as a major world economic force. So controlling the seas might have been a motivational goal but in the end England would have been better off emulating the success of the German manufacturing & export economy rather than destroying it.Haddock spends an entire chapter on 'strategy' and its very good. But it leaves out the fact that strategy is a method of achieving goals, and the first step is to set then validate the legitimacy of those goals. Our goals should be a strong America - and that comes first from jobs, infrastructure, agriculture, and healthcare. Way down on the list is a border dispute between China and Vietnam.I can't emphasis what a great author Haddock is and how well this book is written and how knowledgeable he his and how effectively he supports his arguments. I just disagree with the priority of thesis and the best way to approach it. More importantly, why should the American middle class who has suffered so much under globalism now be asked to preserve it?

Haddick goes a little further than most authors whose books are geared towards a general audience in addressing the serious deficiencies in US Defense policy in the Pacific. Although the rise of the PLAN has been the subject of serious scholarly discussion in prestigious journals such as the Naval War College Review, such seldom bleeds over into mainstream publications. Unfortunately, much of his well-made points in Chapter 8, such as: (1) the need for more long-range aircraft (distances in the Pacific Basin far exceed those of current aircraft capabilities), (2) the need to close the missile gap with China which has rendered our entire carrier fleet largely ineffective out to 2,000 km from the Chinese coast; (3) the need for autonomous missiles to regain control of the sea lanes near China, (4) the need to protect reconnaissance and communications (especially relying on satellite feeds which are now dangerously at risk) have not been taken as seriously as they should be. In Chapter 9, he describes, without the usual sensationalism, America's lethargic response to a vital national security issue despite unmistakable and abundantly clear warnings of the dangers from well placed sources in the naval intelligence world. Fortunately, in Chapter 10, he does lay out some specific political, economic, and military responses to address the situation. Although his proposed remedies do not provide an exhaustive solution to a very difficult strategic problem, he at least provides some constructive and specific grounds for discussion on how to reach what would likely turn out to be a workable solution--something that has been largely ignored by the current administration (but that will be faced by its successor, regardless of the political party in power). "Fire on the Water" is a "must read" for general audience readers as well as members of Congress with little or no military experience who are trying to understand the U.S.-China military strategy contest in the South China Sea.

An excellent overview of the issues in the region. The specific aims of the parties, their strengths and weaknesses and possible conflict resolution approaches. An excellent primer for the uninitiated.

An alarming bit of realism all Americans must be prepared to counter if America is to survive for generations to come. Vividly points out the risks of holding onto out moded WWII era defense policies, practices and strategies.

Outstanding summary of where we are in US -Chinese naval power and where we are going.

Anyone having any concern about a potential Sino-American conflict (and every adult American should) will profit from reading this book.

Well worth reading

A must read for all Americans...pay attention.

very good account of how the Pacific may change in the next 20 years --however one needs to keep an open mind --but very interesting