Kill Bin Laden: A Delta Force Commander's Account of the Hunt for the World's Most Wanted Man

First off, I would like to commend the so called Mr. Fury for writing this book, it took lots of guts and exceptional ethics to write a book that snidely questions high level military decisions and then show the negative impact those decisions had on the Tora Bora battle. Unfortunately, soldiers are taught not to question authority and to keep secrets no matter how bad the infraction or the outcome. However, Fury was obviously furious (his chosen last name speaks for itself) of the numerous military blunders and the blatantly incompetent decisions that ran contrary to everything he learned as a member of one of the most elite fighting forces in the world. Fury seems to either smell a rat in the upper chain of command (including civilian) or was overwhelmed by its incompetence. In any case, Fury confirms from a military point of view how these poor decisions were a detriment to the Tora Bora battle and how they allowed for OBL's escape. In writing this book, Fury correctly decides that a soldier's alliance should be to the country and citizens he serves, not to incompetent senior military and civilian officials who fail to be held accountable for atrocious and erroneous decisions during wartime.Fury has written an interesting book that "primarily" details Delta Forces 10 day involvement in the Tora Bora battle from December 7th up to the December 16th surrender of only a couple dozen remaining AQ fighters (also includes some of Detla's pre-planning and post assessments). Fury tells us that he is compelled to write this book because of "misinformation" about the Tora Bora battle; however, Fury's story is "basically" in line with much of the mainstream media's reporting including articles in Time (December 2001), Christian Science Monitor (March 2002), Washington Post (April 2002), Newsweek (August 2002), Knight Ridder (October 2002), The Atlantic (October 2004), and the New York Times (September 2005). The primary difference between Fury and the media is that this author estimates 1,500 to 3,000 AQ fighters at the battle while most of the articles estimate 1,000 to 2,000, with most erring to the lower end estimate. In addition, several of the articles had OBL possibly leaving Tora Bora in the first week of December while Fury thinks OBL escaped around December 15th. Lastly, Fury's team actually joins the battle at a relatively late stage and this book does not cover a lot of the critical battle and intelligence information before that time.Fury's first hand account of the battle provides attention grabbing detail and describes some of the interesting interactions between a highly trained elite fighting unit and the undisciplined pay-as-you-go Afghan hired guns who felt it necessary to give up their positions each day so they can go back to celebrate their Ramadan dinner (iftar) at sunset. If it was not for the disgusting and unacceptable fact that OBL and about 1,000 other AQ's escaped from Tora Bora because of some of these problems, these cultural and communication problems would actually be kind of funny. Unfortunately, OBL's escape from Tora Bora is not a laughing matter; however, this perpetual war was doomed from the beginning and OBL's "miraculous" escape from Tora Bora was assured long before Delta Force showed up there on December 7th. Like Keane and Hamilton claimed in their book about the 9/11 Commission, Fury was set-up to fail, and this is what this book ultimately implies.Like a good and obedient soldier, Fury only mentions what critics have said are the "three spectacular military blunders" that led to the failure to capture OBL and other AQ leaders:1. No real American ground troops were provided (there were more journalists in Tora Bora than American soldiers).2. The US relied on Afghan proxies, many of whom were sympathetic to OBL / AQ, to carry out the critical ground war while relying on American bombing from 30,000 feet.3. The US relied on Pakistan to seal off the Afghanistan / Pakistan border.Although this book does not necessarily critique the above decisions, it does show from a military perspective how the many failures at Tora Bora, including OBL's escape, resulted from these dreadful decisions. By the time the Afghanistan war started the Bush Administration was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that it was OBL and his al-Qaeda organization that was responsible for 3,000 Americans lives, $30+ billion of physical damage, and potentially hundreds of billions of economic loss. For the attack on the significantly under-manned and under-armed Taliban and AQ forces not to have included for the capture or killing of the individuals believed to be responsible for this atrocity should be incomprehensible, especially when these individuals were handed to the US military on a golden platter in the hills of Tora Bora.Although Fury's book does not break a lot of new ground relating to the above larger picture failures, it does provide some interesting facts that make a rational person think, "what the fu@! were our military and civilian leaders thinking?" Following is some of the new and important information Fury tells us about the Tora Bora battle:1. Delta Force made several compelling recommendations which could have led to the capture of OBL, all meant to secure the known back door escape route to Pakistan. These recommendations included attacking OBL's position from the rear (south) or dropping mines on the likely escape routes to slow down any potential AQ escapees. All these recommendations were rejected by senior military and civilian officials (Fury feels the decisions may have gone as high as POTUS). According to Fury, it was very rare that Delta's recommendations were not approved by the chain of command, and during his five year tenure, the rejection of the Tora Bora recommendations were his first and only instances.2. When Fury's Delta team arrived in Afghanistan, there were a couple hundred Army Rangers and another Delta team already in the theater which could have assisted Fury's team in the ground war. However, in what Fury referred to as a "silly deception plan dreamed up by parties unknown," the majority of these soldiers were sent home to try and fool OBL into thinking we were leaving the theater of operation so AQ would let down their guard. According to Fury, "the naivete' of that idea still boggles my mind today, why were we not pouring all available assets into Afghanistan rather than withdrawing our strength. "3. Fury's team was not provided basic and readily available intelligence information like satellite photos, maps of cave entrances, etc., and the Delta team had to study much of the Tora Bora area from scratch (the CIA helped build many of the cave hideouts and Fury notes that Richard Clarke had these satellite maps in an exercise he conducted in 2000).4. In the context of being micromanaged by "higher-up," Fury states that Delta was ordered to send "exact" grid coordinates of their teams to various folks in Washington. Maybe I'm reading too much between the lines, but wouldn't Delta's exact grid coordinates have come in very handy for someone trying to escape from Tora Bora?5. Fury recants the following from Ron Suskind's, "One Percent Doctrine." A senior CIA operative briefing Bush and Cheney displayed satellite imagery to prove Pakistan's military was not yet in place to accomplish the task of cutting off potential AQ escapees and that Pakistan could not be counted on to fulfill their promise of troops to secure the area. According to Suskind, Bush was not completely swayed and The Decider decided to trust Pakistan. Fury was clearly appalled that the back door remained open to AQ. 6. On December 14th Delta requested needed weapons and mortars from Army Rangers stationed at nearby Bagram airbase (80 miles north of Tora Bora), but for reasons that still elude Fury, that request was denied. Finally on December 16th, around the day OBL is expected to have escaped and the remaining AQ surrender, a directive came from Americans at Bagram to ask the Muj general Ali if he would accept a larger foreign presence on the battlefield, not just a few more Special Ops types, but a massive and overt buildup of American military forces. How do you say a day late and a dollar short in Pashto?7. Fury definitively concludes that OBL was in Tora Bora during the fighting, there is no doubt in his mind. From alleged sightings to the radio intercepts to news reports from various countries to captured AQ prisoners, it was repeatedly confirmed that OBL was there.Unfortunately, what this book is not clear in telling us is that Mr. Fury's Delta Force unit was actually one of the last teams to join the Tora Bora battle. Following is critical information that Fury does not disclose in his book but is important in understanding the entire dynamics of the Tora Bora battle:1. Tora Bora was a well-known AQ stronghold, and had drawn some US military fire since the beginning of the Afghanistan war (along with nearby Jalalabad). Many of the Tora Bora bunkers were made with CIA assistance and it was a well known fact that Tora Bora provided an ideal escape route into Pakistan approximately 10 to 20 miles south.2. In late October, US intelligence reports began noting that AQ fighters and leaders were moving into and around the nearby city of Jalalabad (approx 30 mi's north of Tora Bora). OBL gave a speech in Jalalabad on November 10th, and on November 13th a convoy of several hundred cars and 1,000 or more AQ and Taliban fighters fled to Tora Bora while the US bombed the Jalalabad airport but ignored the huge convoy.3. On November 16th, the Tora Bora battle begins in earnest, with intensified US bombing of the mountainous stronghold. It's around this time that the two Afghan warlords are first recruited to wage America's ground war and by the end of the month they have gathered about 2,000 fighters.4. On November 26th 1,200 marines arrive in Kandahar approximately 250 miles southwest of Tora Bora. Beforehand, CIA Deputy Director Hank Crumpton tells General Franks that the back door is open in Tora Bora and that these troops should go there instead, but Franks disagrees.5. In late November , Indian intelligence, along with several US intelligence officers, confirm that 3 - 5,000 people were flown out of Kundez, approximately 200 miles north of Tora Bora. Although most of these individuals were "suppose" to have been Pakistani "intelligence" operatives trapped in Afghanistan (some speculate that the Pakistani were supporting their friends the Taliban), there is speculation that many Taliban and AQ also escaped on those flights. It is believed that Rumsfeld personally approves these airlifts.6. During the first week of December, Gary Bernsten, the CIA agent in charge at Tora Bora, makes a formal request for 800 troops to be deployed along the Pakistani border to prevent OBL's escape. Despite military and intelligence officials further warning Franks that the two main Afghan generals in Tora Bora cannot be trusted, Bernsten's request is denied.7. By December 5th, 4,000 marines have now arrived in Afghanistan under the command of General James Mattis. Mattis is convinced that with these numbers he could have surrounded and sealed off OBL's lair, as well as deploy troops to the most sensitive portions of the largely unpatrolled border with Pakistan. Mattis argued strongly that he should be permitted to proceed to the Tora Bora caves, but he was turned down like everyone else.The book covers the rest of the Tora Bora battle similarly to many of the other documented accounts of the events, including the "unapproved Delta" cease fire on December 12th, which is believed to have given OBL the breathing room he needed to escape, and the alleged sightings and radio intercepts of OBL over the next several days. Fury counted about 220 dead AQ's and another 52 captured, meaning that about 1,000+ AQ fighters along with OBL escaped the one month US / Mujh onslaught. Most escaped through Tora Bora's back door into Pakistan, the one route everyone knew would be used, including Dalton Fury.Like the dozens of intelligence failures that led to the September 11th attacks, senior military and civilian officials failed to connect the logical dots at Tora Bora that would have allowed for the capture or killing of "the most" wanted man in the entire world and another 1,000+ of his closest friends. Also similar to the 9/11 attacks, not one single individual has been held accountable for the blatant and predictable failures at Tora Bora that led to OBL's escape. In fact, when the failures of the Tora Bora battle became a topic of the 2004 elections, Tommy Franks and Dick Cheney flat out lied when they said there was no proof Bin Laden was ever in Tora Bora in November / December 2001. I would think that Franks' and Cheney's blatant lies that run counter to Fury's own first hand conclusions are one of the things that motivated him to write this book. Consequently, Gary Bernsten's book "Jawbreaker" has been so heavily redacted that he is suing the CIA for excessive censorship of his book on the war and the Tora Bora battle. It is terrible that we live in a democracy where transparency and accountability can be ignored by a chosen few, but it is refreshing that Dalton Fury has done his part in trying to correct this injustice and to help clarify some of the events and errors of the Tora Bora battle.

Let me say first that before reading Kill Bin Laden I was deeply skeptical about the need to publish this book. I doubted the wisdom of publishing during time of war a book that exposes many of our most vital national defense secrets, namely those related to America's premier counterterrorism force, 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment - Delta (1SFOD-D), or Delta Force. However, in reading KBL it became obvious to me that in fact very little information of a sensitive nature that would be of any real value to our adversaries is revealed. Much information is redacted, names and identities disguised, etc., in an effort ostensibly to satisfy those charged with safeguarding our national security interests.There is little doubt, however, that such efforts may fail to placate those in the Special Operations community, particularly many members of Delta past and present, who feel that the author, Dalton Fury (a pseudonym), in writing this book (which incidentally, the author contends, was never fully vetted by U.S. Special Operations Command despite repeated requests) is breaking faith with members of what is arguably one of the most secret and exclusive fraternities in the world. To the extent Fury discusses (however obliquely) the Delta selection process and other little known aspects of how Delta operates, he may be an unwelcome sight at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.But debating the author's loyalty to an organization devoted to counterterrorism during a global war on, well, terrorism may be of less interest to readers than an evaluation of the book itself. No doubt what readers really want to know is whether this book is worth picking up and the $[...]+ Amazon price tag. To that end, you might want to consider the following: Inherent in writing any non-fiction book about U.S. Special Operations, particularly one that must bear up to the scrutiny of the Special Operations community, is the risk of divulging classified information. The content of any book such as KBL will be limited by how much can actually be revealed. Given that Delta's operations are classified and remain so for years (the U.S. Army refuses to even publicly acknowledge Delta's existence), one can expect the details of operations as sensitive as that to decapitate Al Qaeda to remain under wraps.And therein lies the fundamental problem with KBL.Because so much of what happened during what was indisputably a bold, decisive attempt at killing the world's most wanted terrorist remains classified, there are significant gaps in the story. For instance, while the book's jacket alludes to decisions that were made to tie the hands of Fury and his team at the upper levels of the military and government, the book does not really explain those decisions. What exactly were the decisions and who made them? To what extent were the operations hamstrung by those decisions? What was the outcome?Aside from the Delta operators being restricted from entering Afghanistan through Pakistan and being required to put the Afghan mujahedeen in the lead in all operations (and these were significant hindrances, to be sure), it is not clear from reading this book how Delta's efforts were constrained by senior leader decisions, much less whether such constraint was warranted. Too much information is omitted.Because the behind-the-scenes decision-making at the strategic level of command remains classified, we do not have all the facts. Readers might infer from reading this book that senior leaders all the way up to POTUS may have hesitated before (metaphorically) pulling the trigger and thereby letting Bin Laden escape. There is no evidence of that... or at least we are not offered any.Despite this significant flaw, KBL offers some highly entertaining reading. Through a combination of bad luck, timid and disloyal muhjahedeen, and feckless senior Afghan 'military' leadership, the operation to deliver Bin Laden 'dead or alive' never achieves its desired end state. Regrettably, the terrorist leader escapes to Pakistan. But this in no way reflects poorly on the Delta operators who carefully plan, prepare, and repeatedly risk their lives in this exceedingly dangerous endeavor. How they determinedly pursue their quarry, in spite of repeated setbacks, is well worth the price of the book. Simply great stuff!Kill Bin Laden is a fascinating read for those fans of the military affairs genre and U.S. Special Operations enthusiasts alike. Most interesting perhaps is the depiction of how Delta operators rely on Combat Air Controllers and how integral these skilled U.S. Air Force special operators are to Delta's mission accomplishment. Also, Fury heaps praise on Special Forces 'A' Teams which, while replaced by Delta operators in the fight early on, still offer worthy and capable support to the mission. Finally, we witness the superior combat prowess of the British Special Boat Squadron (SBS) commandos who augment Fury's team.Having known a couple of Delta members in a previous life, I can attest to their being the very best soldiers the U.S. Army has to offer. Superb leaders, uncommon warriors, fearless patriots - our country is absolutely blessed to have men such as Dalton Fury who serve selflessly and without any pretense of glory or accolade. They are among the world's elite warriors!For these noble Americans Tora Bora was the opportunity to prove their mettle... to contribute to the annals of audacious American commando exploits that include Pointe du Hoc, Cabanatuan ('The Great Raid'), Son Tay, and Desert One. They did not disappoint. It is obvious from Kill Bin Laden that, in spite of numerous obstacles over which they had little control, Fury and his men acquitted themselves remarkably well against the best of Bin Laden's men. Though they did not emerge with the prize, Delta inflicted massive damage on Al Qaeda.While reasonable people can disagree about whether publishing this book was the right thing to do, there is no questioning the courage and patriotism of this exceptional breed of men. Kill Bin Laden shows us why Delta Force continues to capture the imagination and earn the heartfelt praise of every American committed to prevailing in the Global War on Terror.An Entertaining Read!

Kill Bin Laden by “Dalton Fury” (pseudonym – real name is Major Tom Greer (now deceased)) is not a boy’s-own action book about contacts and gun fights in the mountains of Afghanistan. Rather, it is much more a sombre book about the frustrations of command during a contemporary Special Forces mission in Afghanistan in the cold winter of 2001.Fury was an on the ground commander for the United States’ 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment – Delta, usually known as Delta Force, which is modelled on the British Special Air Service (SAS). Fury was given a simple order that he translated in to three words, the title of this book: kill Bin Laden. He and his team were flown in to Eastern Afghanistan and specifically, the Afghan-Pakistan border mountain range of Tora Bora, which was the snow-capped mountainous hideout of Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda.Much of this book concerns the interactions with indigenous friendly forces: the bribery of local warlords to buy their allegiance, as the Americans wanted an Afghan face on this attack, for the purposes of public relations. The local Afghan “tactics” of advance during the day, fire off some undisciplined rounds in the general direction of the enemy, loot the bodies for anything valuable and then retreat and give up the ground before nightfall. This approach was an anathema to Western forces, who valued physical domination of the battlefield and as such, often stayed for extended periods in hidden observation posts (of course, they were aided by the use of night vision goggles (NVGs and bits of high-tech kit).This book also has a strong emphasis on the relentless focus on bombing, coordinated by the Delta teams on the ground. Spotters in observation posts would be speaking to pilots to bring them in on target, sometimes verbally and sometimes with the use of laser target designators, all in an effort to destroy the al-Qaeda personnel and mortars, who seemed to be the only effective form of defence they had. This will be very familiar to you if you have read Sergeant Paul Grahame's Fire Strike 7/9, which is about a British Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) working on the ground in Afghanistan, though Grahame's book is much more detailed.At one stage, Fury thought they might be within two thousand metres of Bin Laden, based on communications intercepts and visual sightings that corresponded to his description. Unfortunately, this happened at night and the team was not in a position to advance against a rumoured 1000 strong opposition force. Fury’s call not to progress he believes was the right call but also one that he regretted the most. His other frustrations included: wanting to surprise al-Qaeda from the Pakistan border approach, effectively coming in high through their back door – this strategy was rejected by senior command; wanting to carpet bomb the main escape route out of the mountains in to Pakistan – again, rejected by senior command; wanting to position a strong blocking force along the escape route – again, rejected.Fury’s book, Kill Bin Laden, is a valuable look at the pressures and frustrations of modern day command of a special forces unit. It’s not a book with much “action” and neither is it a mindless piece of xenophobia (Fury has his political opinions, of course). Calm and reasonably detailed, this is a useful piece of frontline history. I would recommend reading this after Gary Berntsen’s book, Jawbreaker, which is written by the CIA’s field commander in Afghanistan at the same time.

Good book. The Delta guys are obviously excellent soldiers on a par with the SAS/SBS. Not about endless firefights but the brave guys in small teams laying in OP'S up close. Calling in air strikes.

What a warrior! Hand Salute.

A must read for everybody, who wants to know whats what.This book pulls no punches and gives credit where its due. A lot of people ask me a good read about the unit, afghanistan etc., and the first source I have pointed to is this masterpiece.Thank you Dalton, for this great book and your service !

Great book. Very well written/told. I must have read it 3-4 times. Enjoy it very time and I just might want to read it again.