Philosophy in the Flesh: the Embodied Mind & its Challenge to Western Thought

This book argues that human abstract thinking is built upon sensory-motor and concrete thinking, which form the universal foundations of human cognitive activity, and that all abstract thinking is comprised of metaphors for these foundations. The writers presume that since the early development of human intelligence takes place within the context of our bodies and our interactions with the physical environment the cognitive mechanisms for abstract thinking are based on neurological layers built above the sensory motor modes on to which they are mapped. These are not new ideas, of course. The developmental stages of Piaget provide a parallel perspective on human cognitive ontology. Contemporary research in artificial intelligence presuppose the same. Lakoff and Johnson, while presuming the same, are not concerned with marshalling the evidence to justify this position. It becomes the ideological foundation of their broadside against the entire body of western thought.The evidence presented by Lakoff and Johnson for their hypothesis is entirely comprised of a linguistic analyses of the metaphors we use when talking about abstract ideas. They argue that since we are usually not aware of the sensory- motor and concrete origins of our abstract thinking the borrowed logic of the metaphors prevent us from engaging in true abstract thinking. Neither we nor any of the great philosophical forefathers of Western thought are or were aware of that. We cannot think what we think when we are are thinking, and neither could they. The entire body of Western philosophy can be reduced to a collection of metaphors for the embodied sensory-motor mind.The broadest criticism of Lakoff and Johnson must refer to the negative self reference inherent in their main argument. Their deconstruction of human thinking and all of Western philosophy is itself abstract. If their method gives us a valid critical method that leads to knowledge about the function of human minds and its habits of thinking, then Western philosophy too must preserve its claim to yield valid arguments and true knowledge.Despite this, however, these authors do make a valid point. Much of our language about abstract concepts is metaphorical. This insight is not new. Besides the usual favorites of postmodern writers such as Neitzche and Freud who both discussed (besides using) metaphor, the issues is not new to philosophical debate. Even Aristotle, the linguistic essentialist par excellence, talked about the use of metaphor. Besides the evidence offered by Lakoff and Johnson, there is a large body of evidence from evolutionary psychology, cognitive psychology and the study of artificial intelligence which contribute to the view of human intelligence, broadly speaking, as having been shaped by embodied sensory motor mechanisms and experiences. Unfortunately, very little of this evidence was marshaled by these authors. Lakoff and Johnson's chief conclusion does not follow from the data they present.Metaphorical thinking may be a barrier to pure abstract thinking but at another level it may be the bridge which enables us to grapple with concepts outside the sensory-motor and concrete operations of everyday life. Why it should not be possible to meaningfully map systems of abstract ideas onto the metaphors is not explained by Lakoff and Johnson. Simply to point out that the language of abstract thinking is metaphorical does not prevent it from being the language of abstract thinking. Lakoff and Johnson's rather cavalier dismissal of the entire body of Western philosophy is not convincing. The corpus of Kant's work, for example, cannot be reduced to the "strict father" metaphor which Lakoff and Johnson claim to find underlying almost everything he said; a description which in any case is dubious at best. Where these metaphors can be found, they do not invalidate Kant's systematic and monumental works, which have their own meaning. In some places, the metaphors seem to be found more strongly in Lakoff and Johnson's presentation than in the original works. Kant was mistaken in some central aspects of epistemology. His synthetic a priori judgments, which he took to be certain and necessary truths, became shaky with the development of electrodynamic theory in the 19th Century and lost all credibility after general relativity was discovered in the early part of the 20th. But Western thought moved on. Einstein freely used spatial metaphors to describe the formalism of relativity but these in no way invalidate his theory. It is interesting to note that the most abstract of contemporary theories of matter employ terms such as "spin", "color" and "charm" to designate formal entities which we know can have no such physical meaning; they are merely terms in equations describing properties of quantum waves. The use of these metaphors, as distinct from calling them "particle a", "particle b" and so one, has no impact on the truth or validity of quantum formalism.Where Lakoff and Johnson are able to demonstrate that philosophers have systematically used metaphors in their language, they have failed to demonstrate that the logic of the metaphors is carried over to the thinking of the philosophers in question to such a degree that their works are invalidated. Perhaps this happens some times - but not all the time to everyone. Lakoff and Johnson's arguments are often forced and not convincing. They are indubitably post-modern critics of traditional philosophy and need to be taken with a large pinch of salt (metaphor intended).

Despite opening the book with their modest claim, "philosophy can never be the same again," George Lakoff and Mark Johnson are correct, if they are speaking for the thirty years of philosophy and feminist theory that preceded the conception of the embodied mind. In short, their undertaking is not "monumental," as some reviewers argue, though Lakoff and Johnson might have you believe that. Rather, their book is a lucid account of already existing theory, albeit unacknowledged, articulated through their actual groundbreaking work on metaphor.For a very brief, inexcusably incomplete survey of their predecessors, look to any third-wave feminists, Donna Haraway, Chela Sandoval, Gloria Anzaldua, jeez, even Judith Butler, or any number of accessible philosophers, namely Gilbert Ryle, or semi-accessible pragmatists, John Dewey, C.S. Peirce, or Richard Rorty, and, if you enjoy cryptography, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guatarri and, to a lesser extent, Michel Foucault.As for Lakoff and Johnson's text, I would just read the introduction and, if you have time, the next hundred or so pages on metaphor. The remaining sections, which fill the remaining 400 pages (!), address philosophical debates, such as the long-since defunct deep grammar of Noam Chomsky, and are better left to those who plan on writing the authors' biographies. Their writing style, which has received some criticism from other reviewers, is clear and accessible, if a bit boring. Honestly, they should have consulted with Ali-G, drawing from his interview with "Norman" Chomsky, and maybe then I wouldn't use the latter two thirds of the book as a sleep aid.At the end of the day, however, they do offer a great account of embodiment, one that goes well beyond aegis of philosophy and cognitive science. You can't blame them for posturing a bit, as they basically wrote the go-to book on metaphor, taking the concept beyond the realm of literary scholars and rhetoricians. Hubris or not, these guys are important to the history of multiple scholarly disciplines and this book marks a significant, if lesser, extension of their landmark Metaphors We Live By.

This hefty volume employs the empirical findings of second generation cognitive science to challenge the Western philosophical belief in a rational disembodied mind. The primary method of critical examination utilizes the theories of "unconscious embodied conceptual metaphor" and its origins in sensorimotor experience, to explain how philosophers (old and new) have arrived at their conclusions using a metaphoric logic they mistakenly thought was literal. As you'd expect in a book written by career academics interested in maintaining credibility, it can be hard going at times, and it is certainly not a light read .I found the prolific re-reading of passages was necessary as the unfamiliar terms used, and the theories that where being propounded eroded my concentration somewhat. Also critical points and theories are repeated in different forms, again and again, which although convenient, gives the feeling that 50% of the book is recycled from itself and that the authors have employed a physical metaphorical trick of their own, "that large volumes carry more weight".On the whole though, if you have the time it is well worth the effort,, as it brings philosophy and modern thought in general up-to-date within the context of discoveries in neuroscience, and it makes it possible to understand the grounding and limits of conceptual reasoning and the errors that ensue when the old philosophies are taken as literal truths.

Obra importante para quem pesquisa cognição. Leitura agradável, que aborda os aspectos filosóficos do tema.

This book is very important... If you intrested in cognitive science, the philosophy of mind and language you should read this book absolutely. I am sure it will change your world view/ external reality understanding, human relations and art... Revolutionnary and very useful book... Metaphor; maybe it will be a little exageration but, as Lakoff-Johnson's interpretations, we can say like Higgs bozon's impact in our day time life since Descartes...Abdullah Şevki

I great read if you are interested in how metaphorical understanding shape our perception of the world

Magnificently informative and well written!! Simply brilliant!! It is probably as relevant today as eighteen years ago... and then some.