Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory

This book is the classic text on Game Theory. Game Theory is about strategy and it applies to a variety of subject matters. Strategy is applied to business, investing, law enforcement, and life in general. Strategy is about examining the situation as given and determining how to maximize your gains. One of the toughest concepts to master is the fact that maximizing one's gains doesn't always mean that one must win or obtain the most. At times it means that one must determine which action to take that can prevent one's opponent from doing as well or better as himself. I have personally found that this book is valuable tool that can be used in the realm of artificial intelligence programming for games.

The fact that I went as far as solving the problems was extra, but the author is diligent in this area. The theory is fascinating. You'll learn that things aren't always what they appear to be.

This is the third game theory book I read (the first two are Game Theory for Applied Economists by Gibbons and Game Theory by Fudenberg & Tirole). This book is good in the sense that the author elaborates the history of game theory and introduces it with simple yet detailed examples. However, I am puzzled why the author jumps right to games of imperfect information after a merely basic introduction of static game. I prefer Fudenberg & Tirole because the book first touches upon games without uncertainty and fully discusses how players make decisions in static game and repeated games. After having built a solid foundation of games without uncertainty, the authors then introduced games with incomplete information. From my perspective this is a more normal way of studying game theory.

Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory" by Eric Rasmusen is a remarkable book that serves as an excellent entry point into the fascinating world of game theory. The book stands out for its ability to strike a balance between mathematical rigour and intuitive understanding. It provides a comprehensive introduction to game theory, covering strategic games, extensive form games, imperfect information games, and Bayesian games. Rasmusen's accessible writing style, coupled with real-world examples and applications, enables readers to grasp the practical relevance of game theory in various domains. The book's emphasis on building a strong foundation of game theory concepts makes it an ideal choice for students and enthusiasts looking to understand the fundamentals. Comparatively, Osborne and Rubinstein's "A Course in Game Theory" offers a wider scope, incorporating both basic and advanced topics. While Rasmusen's book focuses on core concepts, Osborne and Rubinstein delve into cooperative game theory and evolutionary game theory, offering additional insights. This broader perspective can be advantageous for readers seeking a more comprehensive understanding of game theory beyond the fundamentals. On the other hand, Myerson's "Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict" delves deeper into the mathematical aspects of game theory. It explores advanced topics such as Bayesian games, mechanism design, and repeated games, providing a rigorous treatment of strategic decision-making. Myerson's book is better suited for readers who desire a more mathematical and analytical approach to game theory, with an emphasis on modeling and formal analysis. It is also worth mentioning a comparison with Fudenberg and Tirole's "Game Theory," which provides a unique economic perspective on strategic interactions. While their book is not directly comparable to Rasmusen's in terms of content, it offers complementary insights into strategic decision-making within economic contexts. Fudenberg and Tirole's work delves into the strategic interactions between economic agents, making it a valuable companion for readers interested in exploring game theory from an economic standpoint. "Games and Information" by Eric Rasmusen remains a standout choice for its accessible style, comprehensive coverage, and practical applications. It serves as an excellent introductory resource, providing readers with a strong foundation in game theory. While other books in the field, such as Osborne and Rubinstein's "A Course in Game Theory," Myerson's "Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict," and Fudenberg and Tirole's "Game Theory," offer different perspectives and areas of focus, they ultimately supplement Rasmusen's work by expanding on specific topics or providing alternative viewpoints within the realm of game theory.

This book is very informative and one of the best texts to use if you're teaching a Game Theory course.

This textbook was required in the game theory class I took in economics graduate school. For a grad text, it's simple and easy, but that's the beauty of it. I read it cover-to-cover, enjoying each page, and coming away with a deeper understanding and wanting to continue learning and applying the concepts. I guarantee I couldn't do this with the books used in most of my other classes. It helped me do exceedingly well in class and impress my department chair. The author explains concepts in a step-by-step approach, so I never felt overwhelmed. They always returned to examples that were as simple as possible to illustrate the concepts, then built on them as you learn more through the chapters. Applications ranged from war games to business competition to downright silly anecdotes. I see uses for the understanding of game theory I first acquired in this book all the time. People around me become interested and ask me where to get a good primer on the subject. I always recommend this book and lend it out so much that, in honesty, I should just buy another copy.

Read the title. Also, if you study this, you are cool, dont let anyone tell you otherwise. 3 more words.

À la fois convivial (même un peu d'humour) et rigoureux. Super référence ! Je me rappelle notamment que le théorème des fonctions implicites y est expliqué de manière limpide ce qui est assez rare. Abordable pour ce genre d'ouvrages surtout en "hard cover". En suite la partie information est un peu légère à mon goût (voir plutôt Laffont&Martimort et Bolton&Dewaptriont).